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INTRODUCTION

Lawyers are well suited to identify and address social and political
problems in society. Law school training involves not simply learning how the
law addresses societal issues, but also striving to understand deficiencies in the
law and the legal system and weighing possible solutions. In their law practice,
attorneys often must look beyond purely technical legal advice and consider the
moral, social, economic, and political factors that may be relevant to a client's
situation. As a learned profession dedicated to serving more than simply private
interests, lawyers are expected to volunteer in efforts to improve the law and
legal system and, where a deficiency or injustice is observed, to work towards
appropriate change. As members of a profession dedicated to equal justice
under law, lawyers are also expected to lend their time and influence to help
ensure access to legal representation.
Many lawyers have taken this public service ethic to heart. The famous
cases of Brown v. Board of Education,' Miranda v. Arizona,2 Gideon v.
Wainwright,3 Furman v. Georgia,4 and Roe v. Wade,5 to name a few, were
handled by volunteer lawyers who saw injustices and decided to get involved.6
Similarly, countless lawyers spoke out, often at great risk, against government
infringements of civil rights and civil liberties in the 1950s and 1960s,7 and
continue today to lend their voices and talents to public causes

1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Richard C. Reuben, The Case of a Lifetime, 80 A.B.A. J. 70, 71-73 (Apr. 1994).
7. See. e.g., Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392, 395-99 (E.D. La. 1968) (per curiam) (holding
that state court prosecution of attorney for unauthorized practice of law was an unlawful attempt
to harass the attorney over his representation of civil rights plaintiffs); S. REP.NO. 84-824 (1955)
(reporting on the proceedings against attorney Harry Sacher for contempt of the Senate); CEDRIC
BELFRAGE, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION 1945-1960 143 (1973) (noting several attorneys
sentenced to jail for defending alleged Communists); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE
COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION
217-22 (1994) (describing legal efforts to destroy the civil rights work of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund's attorneys); DAVID M. OSHINSKY, A CONSPIRACY SO IMMENSE:
THE WORLD OF JOE MCCARTHY 457--64 (1983) (addressing attorney Fred Fisher's involvement
in the Army-McCarthy hearings).
8. See, e.g., Sam Howe Verhovek, A Klansman's Black Lawyer, and a Principle,N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 1993, at B9 (noting NAACP attorney Anthony P. Griffin's unpopular
representation of the leader of the Texas Knights ofKu Klux Klan); American Bar Association,
ABA Pro Bono Publico Award, at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/probono
publicoaward.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2003) (listing current and past recipients of public
service awards for "outstanding commitment to volunteer legal services for the poor and
disadvantaged"). Professor Geoffrey Hazard argues that the legal profession's norms are
expressed not just by its rules, but also by narratives that are upheld as examples of virtuous
lawyers. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1242-45

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss2/4

2

Kuehn: A Normative
Analysis of the Rights and Duties of Law Professors t
2003]
RIGHTS AND DUTIES TO SPEAK OUT

Law professors, too, have stepped out of the classroom and out of
traditional academic scholarship to address perceived injustices. Examples of
law professors speaking out encompass pro bono litigation,9 legislative drafting
and testimony, 0 community legal education, and the development of expanded
legal services programs." Law professors have spoken out on matters labeled
as liberal political causes, such as civil rights and environmental law, 2 and

(1991). If so, then stories about altruistic lawyers reinforce an ideal of lawyers as professionals
willing to give some of their time and resources to serve the public.
9. See e.g., Martha I. Morgan & Neal Hutchens, The Tangled Web ofAlabama 's Equality
DoctrineAfter Melof: HistoricalReflections on EqualProtectionandthe Alabama Constitution,
53 ALA. L. REV. 135 n.* (2001) (noting the pro bono service of University of Alabama law
professor Martha Morgan on behalf of schoolchildren in public education funding cases);
Symposium, The Rehnquist Years: A Supreme CourtRetrospective, 22 NOVA L. REV. 671 (1998)
(describing some of the significant litigation of law professor Bruce Rogow); Georgetown
Law-Faculty (Online Curriculum Guide), David D. Cole, at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
curriculun/tab faculty.cfm? Status= Faculty&Detail=235 (ast visited Dec. 19, 2003) (noting the
pro bono litigation of law professor David Cole).
10. See, e.g., Edward Cohn, Paul Cassell and the Goblet of Fire: A Conservative
Professor'sAdventure in the LiberalRealm of the Law, THE AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 28, 2000, at
32 (reporting on the legislative drafing work of University of Utah law professor Paul Cassell);
Shailagh Murray, Divine Inspiration: Seminary Article in Alabama Sparks Tax-Code Revolt,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2003, at Al (reporting on the tax reform effort sparked by University of
Alabama law professor Susan Pace Hamill); Cass R. Sunstein, A ConservativeNominee Liberals
Should Love, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2002, at A20 (noting the legislative testimony of University
of Utah law professor Michael McConnell).
11. See, e.g., AALS, PURSUING EQUAL JUSTICE: LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROVISION OF

LEGAL SERVICES 28 (2002) [hereinafter AALS, PURSUING EQUAL JUSTICE], available at
http://www.aals.org/equaljustice/finalreport.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2003) (noting the
involvement of a number of law school faculty and deans in legal services planning processes);
David Luban, Faculty Pro Bono and the Question ofIdentity, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 58, 73 (1999)
(reporting the public service activities of law professors in using students from courses to help
obtain earned income tax credits for low-income clients and teaching high school students legal
research skills for a neighborhood improvement project); University of Tennessee College ofLaw,
FrancesLee Ansley, at http://www.law.utk.edu/faculty/facultyansley.htm (last visited Dec. 19,
2003) (reporting on the community legal education work of law professor Frances Lee Ansley);
see also Douglas L. Colbert, BroadeningScholarship: EmbracingLaw Reform andJustice, 52
J.LEGAL EDUC. 540, 542-43 (2002) (identifying public service opportunities for law professors
that include drafting legislation, developing fact-finding reports, testifying before legislative
committees, helping reorganize court systems, writing op-ed pieces, speaking to community
groups, writing legal materials for lay audiences, and engaging in litigation).
12. See, e.g., Robert R. Kuehn, Shooting the Messenger: The Ethics of Attacks on
EnvironmentalRepresentation,26 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 417,425-31 (2002) (reporting on the
pro bono environmental work of law professors Zygmunt Plater at the University of Tennessee,
William Luneburg and Jules Lobel at the University of Pittsburgh, Patrick McGinley at the
University of West Virginia, and Mark Squillace at the University of Wyoming); Loyola
University of New Orleans School of Law, William P. Quigley, at http://law.loyno.edu/faculty/
quigley.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2003) (noting the public service work of law professor William
Quigley on issues such as civil liberties, public housing, and voting rights).
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those issues deemed more conservative, such as victims' and property rights.'
On a number of occasions, these public service activities risked damaging the
professor's teaching position.' 4 Yet, in spite of many publicized cases of law
professor activism on issues of public concern, and in spite of American Bar
Association (ABA) law school accreditation standards establishing an
5
obligation on law faculty to engage in public service work," the actual amount
of legally-related public service work by law professors is thought to be quite
modest.6
This Article analyzes the normative bases for the rights and duties of law
professors to speak out on issues of public concern. Even though altruistic
reasons, rather than professional expectations, likely motivated the exemplary
members of the legal academy identified above to get involved in public issues,
public service norms play an important role in the legal profession and
academy. Public service norms express the values of the profession. As such,
the prevalence and strength of the norms provide guidance to law professors
concerning what they should teach and what behaviors they should emulate as
role models for students. Furthermore, norms on the rights and the duties of
lawyers express the expectations that the legal profession has for lawyers, both
new and old.
For many, professional norms are a motivation to get involved, because
they respect and wish to follow the profession's expectations. Identified norms
also serve to validate behavior that some law professors would, in any event,
like to emulate. Particularly where others may seek to prevent or punish public
service, demonstrating the rights and duties to serve may help thwart such
opposition. Clearly-defined norms also should motivate law schools and other
academic institutions to value and support service activities. Finally, public
service norms communicate to the public the values of the legal profession and
the appropriate role of lawyers on issues of access to justice and legal system

13. See, e.g., Cohn,supra note 10 (reporting on the public service work of law professor
Paul Cassell on victims' rights, the death penalty, and the Mirandaruling); Richard A. Epstein,
Not Too Late to Stop Soldier Field Giveaway, CHi. TRIB., May 5, 2002, at 11 (referencing
University of Chicago law professor Richard Epstein's public service work on property rights
issues).
14. See, e.g., Kuehn, supra note 12, at 430-31 & n.64 (reporting on pressure to dismiss
University of Pittsburgh law professor Tom Buchele and the attempt to deny tenure to University
of West Virginia law professor Patrick McGinley over their public service work); Amy
Sieckmann, Hamill: Christian Coalition Trying to Discredit Her Stance, ANNISTON STAR
(Anniston, Ala.), Mar. 12, 2003, at IA (reporting on attacks on University of Alabama law
professor Susan Pace Hamill over her efforts to reform the state's tax code).
15. See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 264-65 and accompanying text. Clinical law professors may be an
exception to this limited amount of public service work since clinical professors often donate
considerable time to outside public service projects. Colbert, supranote 11, at 550 (reporting that
clinical law professors indicated in a 2001 survey that two-thirds had taken leadership roles in
public service projects).
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reform, thereby educating the public and possibly increasing public support for
lawyer public service.
Focusing exclusively on norms creates the possibility that failing to
establish a convincing or enforceable norm allows one to argue that no
responsibility or expectation exists. Demonstrating a normative basis for a law
professor's extramural public service activities, however, does not suggest that
7
in the absence of a norm a law professor should not or could not speak out.'
Thus, it is worthwhile to consider the presence and strength of the norms
that govern the rights and duties of law professors to speak out. Looking at
those norms, Part II of this Article addresses laws that affect the right of a law
professor to participate in "out of the classroom," or extramural, activities. Part
III explores the legal profession's established precepts on the rights and duties
of a lawyer to perform public service. Part IV similarly addresses the legal
academy's view of public service. Part V concludes that although there are
established rights and duties of a law professor to speak out, the academy
should do more to encourage and assist the public service activities of law
professors.

II. LAWS AFFECTING THE RIGHT OF LAW PROFESSORS TO SPEAK OuT
Professors, as a general rule, have the same right to speak out on issues of
public concern as other citizens. Yet university employers and rules of the legal
profession may impose restraints on law professors that citizens do not
generally face.
A.

Restrictions on the Right of University Employees to Speak Out

State statutes addressing government employees 8 and university
employment policies 9 often impose limits on the out-of-classroom activities of

17. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT scope 16 (2003) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]
(arguing that the Model Rules do not "exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should
inform a lawyer"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974)
(noting thatjust because certain behavior is not forbidden by disciplinary rules does not mean that
such behavior is consistent with applicable ethical considerations).
18. See, e.g., Hoover v. Morales, 164 F.3d 221, 223-24 (5th Cir. 1998) (analyzing an
appropriations bill prohibiting state employees from serving as consultants or expert witnesses
in litigation against the state); Atkinson v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark., 559 S.W.2d 473, 474
(Ark. 1977) (en banc) (analyzing a law prohibiting certain law school faculty positions from
handling or assisting in any lawsuit); see also Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, An Ethics Critique
ofInterference in Law School Clinics, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1971, 1977-78 (2003) (reporting
the unsuccessful efforts ofthe Colorado and Idaho legislatures to prohibit law school faculty from
participating in litigation against the state).
19. See, e.g., Trister v. Univ. of Miss., 420 F.2d 499, 501 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969) (discussing
a university policy that prohibited outside employment that brings discredit to the institution or
brings the employee into antagonism with colleagues, the community, or the state); Crue v. Aiken,
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professors. In addition, even in the absence of laws or policies, universities
sometimes seek to discipline professors for extramural activities.20 Where these
rules or employment actions simply aim to prevent outside activities from
interfering with a professor's work responsibilities, they raise few legal
concerns. However, when the university limits or punishes controversial
extramural speech that is unrelated to the professor's ability to successfully
perform her job, First Amendment, Equal Protection, and, in some cases,
contract law principles may protect the professor's right to speak out.
"It is clearly established that a State may not discharge [or otherwise
punish] an employee on a basis that infringes that employee's constitutionally
protected interest in freedom of speech."2 Even where an employee may be
discharged for any or no reason, the employee may be entitled to constitutional
protection if punished for exercising a constitutional right to freedom of
expression. 2 However, most constitutional rights only protect against
infiingement by governments or public officials.23 Therefore, professors at
private law schools generally do not have valid constitutional claims against the

2002) (analyzing a university directive that prohibited
204 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1134-35 (C.D. Ill.
contact by faculty with prospective student athletes without prior authorization from the
university); UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, Policy on Faculty Consulting and Outside

Activities-Amherst & Boston lI.C.4 (2001), available at http://www.umassp.edu/policy/
fiscal/facconsultab.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2003) (prohibiting any member of the faculty from
accepting employment as an expert if it would conflict with the University's or State's interests).
20. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,594-95 (1972) (addressing the termination
of a professor for testifying before the legislature and participating in a newspaper advertisement
critical of the college's board of regents); Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1995)
(addressing the university's action in removing a professor as a department chair because of a
controversial off-campus speech); Matthew W. Finkin, "A Higher Order of Liberty in the
Workplace": Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Vortex ofEmployment Practicesand Law,
53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 357,367-68 (1990) (reporting the dismissal of aprofessor because
of an alleged false statement made during a speech on the steps of the state capital); Joseph S.
Stroud, Profs Say USC Dean PressuredThem, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Apr. 21, 2002, at
B 1 (reporting that the law school dean allegedly pressured two professors not to testify as expert
witnesses in a legal malpractice action against a law firm that the dean was soliciting for a major
gift to the school); Robin Wilson & Ana Marie Cox, TerroristAttacks Put Academic Freedom
to the Test, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 5, 2001, at A12 (reporting on pressure on university
administrators to punish professors who publicly criticize United States foreign policy).
21. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987) (citing Perry,408 U.S. at 597).
22. Id. at 383-84 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
283-84 (1977); Perry, 408 U.S. at 597).
23. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (quoting Flagg Bros., Inc., v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978)). This "state action" requirement limits constitutional
protection to instances where "the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [is]
fairly attributable to the State." Id. at 937; see also WILLIAM A. KAPLiN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE
LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 46 (3d ed. 1995) ("Because the Constitution was designed to limit

only the exercise of government power, it does not prohibit private individuals or corporations
from impinging on such freedoms as free speech, equal protection, and due process.").
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school for interference with their out-of-classroom speech because those
universities are not considered state actors.24
While the First Amendment protects the speech rights of professors at
public law schools, the Supreme Court has recognized that the government may
impose restraints on public employee speech that it could not otherwise impose
on private persons or nongovermment employees. 25 In Pickering v. Board of
Education,26 the Court addressed the scope of First Amendment protection
afforded a teacher who sent a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the way the
school board handled tax increases." The Court stated that in determining the
scope of First Amendment protection afforded to public employees, a court
must "arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees."28 Thus, when a law professor's speech pertains to a matter of
"public concern," a public law school may only impose restrictions if the school
shows that its interest as an employer in "efficiency" outweighs the professor's
interest in free speech.
To determine if a matter may be "fairly characterized as constituting speech
on a matter of public concern," courts look to the speech's content, form, and
context. 29 Matters addressing political, social, or other community concerns are
deemed of public concern; those characterized as employee grievances over
internal office policies generally are not.30 Likewise, statements addressed to
24. See, e.g., Krohn v. Harvard Law Sch., 552 F.2d 21, 23-24 (1 st Cir. 1977) (finding that
the university and its law school were not state actors); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 478 F.2d
1137, 1140-43 (2d Cir. 1973) (same); Allison v. Howard Univ., 209 F. Supp. 2d 55,62 (D.D.C.
2002) (same); Martin v. Del. Law Sch. of Widener Univ., 625 F. Supp. 1288, 1300-01 (D. Del.
1985) (same); Bittle v. Okla. City Univ., 6 P.3d 509, 515-16 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000) (same); see
also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837-43 (1982) (taking a narrow view of state action
in considering allegations that discharges of teachers at a private school as a result of opposition
to school policies violated federal constitutional rights of free speech and due process). But cf
Albert v. Carovano, 824 F.2d 1333, 1340-41 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that, in certain
circumstances, the state's involvement in college discipline might be sufficient to classify certain
student disciplinary actions taken by private colleges as state action).
Freedom of speech and assembly provisions in some state constitutions may be interpreted
to provide protection to professors at private universities. See Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d
1382, 1387-91 (Pa. 1981); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615,624-28 (N.J. 1980). In addition, state
law may create a private cause of action against any person, whether or not acting under color of
law, who interferes with the exercise of a person's federal or state constitutional rights. See infra
notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
25. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995).
26. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
27. Id. at 564.
28. Id. at 568.
29. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 147-48 (1983).
30. Id. at 146, 154. Protected speech does not have to address issues of "transcendent
importance" but simply needs to address "matters in which the public might be interested, as
distinct from wholly personal grievances." Dishnow v. Sch. Dist. of Rib Lake, 77 F.3d 194, 197

Published by Scholar Commons, 2004

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55: 253

public audiences, made outside the workplace, and involving content largely
unrelated to employment would more likely be deemed matters of public
concern. 3' The Supreme Court also has held that providing free legal assistance
to individuals or groups asserting their constitutional rights is a mode of
expression and association protected by the Constitution.32 Hence, a law
professor's statements concerning perceived inequities in the law, judicial
system, or judicial decisions, or their participation in pro bono legal activities,
should constitute matters of public concern.
The Pickeringbalancing test requires weighing the employee's interest in
self-expression and participation in public discussions, along with the public's
interest in being informed, against the government's interest in providing
efficient services.33 Considerations for determining how the statement may
affect the effective functioning of the public employer's enterprise include
"whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which
personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of
34
the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise."
In the case of a teacher, the focus is on whether the statement impedes the
teacher's proper performance of classroom duties or interferes with the school's

(7th Cir. 1996).
In discussing speech related to university policies or decisions, one commentator observed
that "no coherent, meaningful line separates intramural speech [critical of university policies or
decisions] held to be of public concern and intramural speech held not to be of public concern."
Ailsa W. Chang, Note, Resuscitating the Constitutional 'Theory' of Academic Freedom: A
Searchfor a StandardBeyond Pickering and Connick, 53 STAN. L. REv. 915, 946 (2001). In
Honorev. Douglas, however, the court found that a law professor's speech about the law school's
admissions policy, the size of its student class, the school's budget, and delays in certifying
graduates for the bar examination embraced subjects of public concern protected by the First
Amendment. 833 F.2d 565, 567,569 (5th Cir. 1987).
31. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454,466 (1995). The initial
burden is on the plaintiff to show that the conduct is protected and that protected speech was a
substantial and motivating factor in an adverse employment decision. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). The employer is then allowed to show that it
would have made the same employment decision even without the presence of the protected
conduct. 1d.
32. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) (explaining that "the First
Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental
intrusion"); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978) ("The First and Fourteenth Amendments
require a measure of protection for 'advocating lawful means of vindicating legal rights."')
(quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 437). See generallyLegal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,
542 (2001) (explaining that an attorney, when representing a client, speaks on behalf of that
person).
33. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. at 563, 568 (1968).
34. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,388 (1987) (citingPickering,391 U.S. at 570-73).
The state has the burden ofjustifying legitimate grounds for any restriction on employee speech.
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regular operation." An employer may only take action against the employee
based on the potential disruption caused by the speech, not in retaliation for the
speech.36
As the public concern element of the speech increases, so does the need for
showing that the statement disrupts the efficient operation of the school." The
public's strong interest in hearing from attorneys on matters of public debate.
further increases the burden on the state to show that the potential
disruptiveness of the speech outweighs its value.38 When the professor's speech
is limited by an existing law or university policy that chills potential speech, the
burden on the government is greater than in the case of an isolated disciplinary

action against an employee.3 9

35. Pickering,391 U.S. at 572-73. In Rankin, the Court also considered it important that
there was no assertion that the remark demonstrated a character trait that made the employee unfit
to perform her work. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 389. The American Association of University Professors
(AAUP) argues that the right of faculty members to speak or write as citizens means that the
extramural statements of professors should only be grounds for discipline if they demonstrate
unfitness for continuing service. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, Committee, A Statement on
ExtramuralUtterances (1964), reprintedin AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 32 (9th ed.
2001) [hereinafter AAUP, Statement on Extramural Utterances].
36. Thus,
a government employer [may] fire an employee for speaking on a matter of
public concern if: (I) the employer's prediction ofdisruption is reasonable;
(2) the potential disruptiveness is enough to outweigh the value of the
speech; and (3) the employer took action against the employee based on this
disruption and not in retaliation for the speech.
Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 99 13 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,
672-73,677-78 (1994)).
37. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 483 (1995)
(O'Conner, J., concurring); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983); Jeffries, 52 F.3d at 13.
For constitutional purposes, it does not matter if the statement was true or false, although the
veracity of the statement might affect the degree to which the statement interferes with the
efficient operation of the employer's enterprise. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 & n.3. Before
disciplining an employee, the public employer must undertake a reasonable investigation intoWhat
the speech actually was and must in good faith believe the facts on which the employer purports
to act. Waters, 511 U.S. at 677-78.
38. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572 (noting how important it is for the public to hear from
teachers since they are the members of the community most likely to have informed and definite
opinions on school funding issues). See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC
8-1 [hereinafter MODEL CODE] ("By reason of education and experience, lawyers are especially
qualified to recognize deficiencies in the legal system and to initiate corrective measures
therein."). The Court has never addressed whether, in the Pickering balancing process, the
academic freedom interests of a professor should be given greater weight than the speech interests
of other public employees. Rachel E. Fugate, Comment, Choppy Waters Are Forecastfor
Academic Free Speech, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 187, 203 (1998).
39. Nat'l TreasuryEmployees Union, 513 U.S. at 468. Where the employer's action chills
speech before it happens, "[tihe Government must show that the interests of both potential
audiences and a vast group of present and future employees in a broad range of present and future
expression are outweighed by that expression's 'necessary impact on the actual operation' of the
Government." Id. (quoting Pickering,391 U.S. at 571).
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Cases addressing laws or university policies that chill potential speech
demonstrate that limits on a professor's extramural expression are rarely
constitutionallyjustified. In Hoover v. Morales,' university professors who had
been retained or had volunteered pro bono to testify in litigation against the
state challenged a state appropriations rider and university policy prohibiting
professors from acting as consultants or expert witnesses on behalf of parties
opposing the state. 4 The court applied the Pickeringtest and found that the
rider and policy had the effect of curtailing speech on matters of public concern
and that there was no evidence that the testimony would adversely affect the
efficient delivery of educational services.42 The rider and policy also drew an
impermissible distinction under the First Amendment based on the content of
the employee's speech-speech by experts on behalf of the state is permitted;
43
speech on behalf of those who oppose the state is punished.
The court in Kinney v. Weaver" interpreted the First Amendment to protect
university employee speech from retaliation by public officials not directly
associated with the university.4" Kinney involved a boycott of certain classes at
a local college by police chiefs and sheriffs as a means of pressuring the college
to remove instructors from the faculty who had testified as experts against the
police in police brutality cases." The court found that this economic pressure,
even though exerted by public officials who were not part of the college, was

40. 164 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 1998).
41. Id. at 223.
42. Id. at 226. The court noted that "there may be occasions when the State's interest in
efficient delivery of public services will be hindered by a state employee acting as an expert
witness or consultant." Id. at 227. It explained that the state's interests are greater when the
employee is a policy maker and that restrictions might not violate the First Amendment if they are
not content-based. Id.
43. Id. at 227. "Regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of
the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment." Hoover v. Morales,
164 F. 3d 221,227 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,648-49 (1984)).
Further, Sanjour v. Envtl. Prot.Agency, 56 F.3d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1995), held that EPA regulations
prohibiting employees from receiving travel expense reimbursement for unofficial speaking or
writing engagements while permitting compensation for officially-authorized speech violate the
First Amendment. Id. at 87. The court explained that there had been no showing that the
employees' and their audiences' interests in the speech were outweighed by the speech's impact
on government operations. Id.; see also Nat'! Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. at 470
(holding that the federal government's ban on receipt of honoraria by government employees
could not be justified on the ground of workplace disruption where the speech at issue did not
involve the subject matter of the employment and occurred outside the workplace).
44. 301 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2002), reh'g granteden banc, 338 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2003)
(considering whether the qualified immunity holding in Noyola v. Texas Dep't of Human Res.,
846 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1988), is applicable to the case).
45. Kinney, 301 F.3d at 275-78.
46. Id. at 257-60.
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intended to deny the instructors the benefit of employment, and, therefore,
violated the Constitution.47
Two cases illustrate the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause in
protecting a law professor's outside activities. Spurred by complaints about the
part-time legal services work of some law school faculty on a school
desegregation case, the dean of the University of Mississippi School of Law
conditioned the continuing employment of these faculty members on ending
their involvement with the legal services program. 4' The dean relied in part on
a university policy that prohibited outside work if it would "bring discredit to
the institution" or "bring the employee into antagonism with his colleagues,
community, or the State of Mississippi."4' 9 The professors filed suit against the
university and the law school dean, alleging a violation of their "academic
freedom, freedom of expression and association, and the right to equal
protection" based on the fact that other faculty members were permitted to
teach while still practicing law and because the university had not claimed that
the outside work would hamper the professors' ability to teach. 50 While noting
that the professors did not have a constitutional right to work part-time outside
the university, the court held that the professors did have a right not to be
treated significantly different from other faculty members." Because the basis
for singling out these faculty from others was only the clients they wished to
represent, the distinction was not valid and denied plaintiffs the equal
protection of the law. 2 Furthermore, given the court's determination that the
motivation for the school's action was the identity of the professor's clients, as
well as the court's finding that there was no evidence that part-time work would

47. Id. at 269-70 (stating that "the Supreme Court has made clear that First Amendment
protection does not depend on whether the governmental action at issue is 'direct' or 'indirect"');
see also Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1209-13 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that efforts by
government officials to pressure a private employer to punish an employee for speeches or
publications on issues of public concern could subject the government to claims that it unlawfully
retaliated against the private employee for exercising her right to free speech); Helvey v. City of
Maplewood, 154 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); Korb v. Lehman, 919 F.2d 243,248 (4th
Cir. 1991) (same).
In another case involving efforts to suppress faculty out-of-classroom speech, the court in
Crue v. Aiken struck down a university directive that prevented faculty members from contacting
prospective student athletes to make them aware of concerns about the university's mascot. Crue
2002). The court found that, as a prior restraint on
v. Aiken, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (C.D. Ill.
speech of public concern, the university had failed to meet its heavy burden of proving that the
interests of university employees and potential audiences were outweighed by the speech's impact
on the operation of the university. Id. at 1143. The court further noted the university failed to
offer any evidence that the recited harms were real, not just conjectural. Id. at 1145.
48. Trister v. Univ. of Miss., 420 F.2d 499, 500-02 (5th Cir. 1969).
49. Id. at 501 n.2 (quoting minutes of the Miss. Bd. of Trs. of Insts. of Higher Learning
(Nov. 17, 1966)).
50. Id. at 502.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 504.
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be detrimental to the quality of instruction received by the students, the law
school's personnel action would not withstand constitutional scrutiny under the
First Amendment standards set forth in Pickeringand its progeny.
In Atkinson v. Board of Trustees of the University ofArkansas, the state
legislature passed a law prohibiting certain faculty positions at the University
of Arkansas School of Law from handling or assisting in any lawsuit.53 The
court held that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment since the classification, involving only three of six faculty classes
and only one of two public law schools in Arkansas, was not reasonably related
to the stated purpose of requiring law school personnel to devote full time to
their job duties.54 The court made clear, however, that it was not saying that the
legislature could not, if the classifications were appropriate, enact a law
restricting outside employment by law school personnel."5 Thus, to the extent
that legislation or policies restrict the out-of-classroom activities of some law
school personnel but not others, the classifications must be rational.5 6
A professor's employment contract may also affect the right to speak out
if that agreement guards the extramural speech of the employee from reprisal
by the university. The significance of such coverage is that these contracts
would even protect the speech rights of academics at private universities.57
The difficulty in basing a right to freedom of extramural speech on contract
law is demonstrating that the employment contract covers such activities. Some
contracts may expressly guarantee the faculty member's academic freedom, but
it is more likely that most simply incorporate by reference another document
that addresses academic freedom, such as a faculty handbook or a statement by
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) or Association of
American Law Schools (AALS). A majority of states recognize that employers

53. 559 S.W.2d 473 (Ark. 1977).

54. Id. at 475-77. The court characterized as entirely speculative the argument that the
restriction was passed for the purpose of silencing a professor who had represented a party in a
suit involving the legislature, and refused to address it as a possible First Amendment violation.
Id. at 476.
55. Id. at 477.
56. Professors employed by public universities also may be protected by federal and state
procedural due process guarantees. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,599-603 (1972); Bd.
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-78 (1972). To state a due process claim, the professor
would have to show: (1) as a result ofsome state action in punishing the professor for extramural
activities, the professor was deprived of a liberty or property interest; and (2) the deprivation of
that interest was done without adequate notice and a fair opportunity to be heard. See, e.g.,
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-46 (1985) (holding that due process

requires that a public employee with a property right in continued employment be given an
opportunity for a hearing before being deprived of that property interest); Llano v. Bergund, 282

F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (8th Cir. 2002) (setting forth the two-step procedural due process analysis).
57. Jim Jackson, Express and Implied ContractualRights to Academic Freedom in the

United States, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 467, 473 (1999) (noting that universities can define an
employee's protected speech rights to be broader than the constitutional definition).
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may be bound by specific promises in personnel handbooks,58 and some courts
have incorporated the terms of handbooks even when there is an express
disclaimer that the manual does not create enforceable rights.59 Thus, when a
faculty handbook either explicitly recognizes the right of faculty members to
participate as a citizen in public debates or adopts the AAUP's or AALS's
academic freedom protections, the professor's term of employment will
generally be viewed as including these protections.
Courts also have incorporated protections and benefits into employment
contracts when the customs, traditions, and past practices of the institution
imply, through a type of institutional common law, that the employee has a
legitimate claim of entitlement to the benefit of such protection."' Thus, as one
commentator observed, "there is a reasonable chance that courts may apply a
common law of the university finding that academic freedom is so entrenched
in the very concept of an American university that it will be implied generally
into employment contracts.'
To enforce any contractual right to freedom of speech, a professor would
also have to demonstrate that academic freedom, even when expressly or
impliedly included in a law school employment contract, protects the
extramural utterances of law professors from reprisal. The AAUP believes that

58. Richard J. Pratt, Comment, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks:
Further Encroachments on the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 208
(1990). The employment-at-will doctrine, which generally proves fatal to any reliance on
employee handbooks since an employer's oral or written promises are not binding unless the
employee supplies additional consideration beyond her usual services, "is becoming increasingly
rare in the United States." Id. (citation omitted).
59. See, e.g., Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding a
faculty handbook was contractually binding on the university where the handbook provided it
would be university practice for deans to give written notice of nonreappointment); Jones v. Cent.
Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783,788 (Alaska 1989) (holding that the personnel policy manual
"creates the impression, contrary to the 'disclaimer,' that employees are to be provided with
certain job protections"); Dillon v. Champion Jogbra, Inc., 819 A.2d 703, 708-09 (Vt. 2002)
(holding that, notwithstanding an employment manual's disclaimer, the employer's practices were
consistent with systems set forth in the manual and inconsistent with at-will employment). See
generally AAUP, FACULTY HANDBOOKS AS ENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS: A STATE GUIDE (1998)

(providing a state-by-state analysis of decisions on whether provisions of a faculty handbook are
enforceable as a contract).
60. See, e.g., Perry,408 U.S. at 602 (observing that there maybe an unwritten common law
in a university that creates certain employment rights); Bason v. Am. Univ., 414 A.2d 522, 525
(D.C. 1980) (holding that resolution of whether a law professor's contract included a right to
certain tenure procedures requires consideration of not only the actual employment contract and
documents expressly incorporated therein, but also of the university's customs and practices);
Matthew W. Finkin, Regulation by Agreement: The CaseofPrivateHigherEducation,65 IOWA
L. REv. 1119, 1146-55 (1980) (recognizing that institutions undertake certain commitments to
the faculty to abide by the institution's rules and customary practices). But cf KAPLIN & LEE,
supra note 23, at 154 ("Although academic custom and usage can fill in gaps in the employment
contract, it cannot be used to contradict the contract's express terms.").
61. Jackson, supranote 57, at 494.
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it does: "The controlling principle is that a faculty member's expression of
opinion as a citizen cannot constitute grounds for dismissal unless it clearly
demonstrates the faculty member's unfitness to serve. Extramural utterances
rarely bear upon the faculty member's fitness for continuing service."62 The
AALS agrees that academic freedom protects extramural utterances since it
requires member schools to provide a faculty member with "academic freedom
and tenure in accordance with the principles of the American Association of
University Professors."'63
Professor William Van Alstyne argues that academic freedom should not
protect the extramural speech of a university professor, in part because he
views political activities as unrelated to the professor's duty or the school's
mission." However, as Professor Peter Byrne observed, and as discussed in
Parts III and IV of this Article, the ethical responsibilities of law professors and
the professional standards for law schools and law professors encourage faculty
members to be involved in public service work, which may involve
controversial extramural utterances.65 Thus, when a law professor engages in
controversial extramural public service, academic freedom should protect the
professor from discipline or censorship by the institution since it would be
inappropriate to label activities expected by the profession and institution as
"aprofessional."
As a final matter, even in the absence of an enforceable contractual right
to speak out without recrimination, some states "insulate political speech and

62. AAUP, Statement on ExtramuralUtterances, supra note 35; see also Am. Ass'n. of
Univ. Professors, 1940 Statement of Principleson Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprintedin
AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3 (9th ed. 2001) [hereinafter AAUP, Statement of
Principleson Academic Freedom and Tenure] ("When [college and university teachers] speak
or write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship ....").This freedom of
extramural speech also comes with special obligations that may not be expected of other citizens
when they speak in public: "to be accurate, to exercise appropriate restraint, to show respect for
the opinions of others, and to make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the
institution." AAUP, Statement on Extramural Utterances,supra note 35, at 32.
63. AALS, Bylaws of the Association of American Law Schools, Inc., § 6-8(d) (2000),
availableat http://www.aals.org/bylaws.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2003).
64. William Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory ofAcademic Freedomand the GeneralIssue
of Civil Liberty, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59, 64, 68-69 (Edmund L. Pincoffs
ed., 1975) (labeling such extramural speech "aprofessional").
65. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom andPoliticalNeutrality in Law Schools: An Essay
on Structure andIdeology in ProfessionalEducation, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315, 330 n.28 (1993).
Byrne suggests that extramural speech in the role of a law professor, such as when the professor
is commenting on a matter relating to the law or legal system, may be distinguished from overtly
political speech by the same person in a nonacademic role. Id.; see also Finkin, supra note 20,
at 367-70 (disagreeing with Van Alstyne); Martin H. Malin & Robert Ladenson, University
FacultyMembers 'Right to Dissent: Towarda Unified Theory ofContractualand Constitutional
Protection, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 933 (1983) (arguing that the law should forbid interference
with university faculty expression in the same way that the First Amendment forbids government
interference with the rights of citizens generally).
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association generally from employer reprisal."" Thus, courts recognize an
exception to the at-will employment doctrine when an employee's discharge is
contrary to a clear mandate of public policy articulated by constitutions,
statutes, or in some states, professional codes of ethics.67 However, the

prevailing view is that free speech provisions in state or federal constitutions
provide a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine only if
there is state action.6" Nonetheless, the exception has been interpreted to
protect private sector employees who provide testimony at legislative orjudicial
hearings.69
B. Restrictions on a Lawyer's Out-of-CourtSpeech
Law professors who are attorneys also may face legal restraints on their

right to speak out publicly about the qualifications or integrity of judges or
other public legal officials or about judicial proceedings. These restrictions
apply broadly to any law professor licensed as an attorney who makes a false
statement about a judicial officer and more narrowly to law professors who
participate in the investigation or litigation of a case.
The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), the basis
for ethics rules in forty-three states and the District of Columbia,70 provide in
Rule 8.2(a) that a lawyer "shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to

66. Finkin, supra note 20, at 370; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (2003)
(creating liability for any employer who disciplines an employee for the exercise of First
Amendment rights); Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 901 (1st Cir.
1988) (applying the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act to create a private cause of action against any
person who interferes or attempts to interfere with the exercise of rights secured by the federal or
state constitution).
67. See, e.g., Rocky Mt. Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 523-25 (Colo.
1996) (en banc) (holding that professional ethical codes may be a source of public policy as long
as the codes serve the public interest and are definite enough to place employers and employees
on notice of required behavior). To prevail, an employee must prove: (1) the existence of a clear
mandate of public policy (clarity element); (2) that discouraging the conduct the employee
engaged in would jeopardize that public policy (jeopardy element); (3) that the conduct caused
the termination (causation element); and (4) that the employer is not able to offer an overriding
justification for the termination (absence ofjustification element). Gardner v. Loomis Armored
Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 382 (Wash. 1996) (en banc).
68. Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578, 589-90 (W.Va. 1998)
(listing cases).
69. See Bishop v. Fed. Intermediate Credit Bank of Wichita, 908 F.2d 658, 662-63 (10th
Cir. 1990); Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482,495 (Md. 2002).
70. ABA Center for Prot'l Responsibility, Dates of Adoption of the Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct [hereinafter ABA Center for Prof'l Responsibility, DatesofAdoption], at
http://www.abanet. org/cpr/mrpc/alphastates.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2003) (listing the states
that have adopted the Model Rules). In February 2002, the ABA amended certain provisions in
the Model Rules in accordance with changes made by the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission. See
ABA Center for Prof'l Responsibility, Ethics 2000 - February 2002 Report, available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-202reportsumm.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2003).
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be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the
qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal
officer."'" Furthermore, a lawyer shall not make false statements concerning a
candidate for a judicial or legal office.72 The ABA's Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (Model Code), originally adopted in 1969 and still
the primary source for the rules of professional conduct in five states,73
similarly prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement
concerning a candidate for a judicial office or against a judge or other
adjudicatory officer. 74 The Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers
(Restatement) tracks the Model Rules by forbidding a lawyer from knowingly
or recklessly making a false statement concerning ajudicial officer or candidate
for such an office, but it does not extend the prohibition to statements about
nonjudicial public legal officers.75
These ethics restrictions apply to lawyers, such as most law professors,
even when not representing clients and to matters not involving litigation.76 In
certain situations, false criticism of a judge, particularly where there is an

71. MODEL RULES, supranote 17, at R. 8.2(a). Restrictions on a lawyer's false criticism of
judicial officers are justified on two grounds: (1) the need to protect public confidence in the
fairness and impartiality of thejudicial system from false accusations that might bring the system
into disrepute; and (2) lawyers, as officers of the court and members of a regulated profession,
give up certain rights to speech that otherwise might be protected by the Constitution. ABA CTR.
FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 582-84 (5th ed.
2003) [hereinafter ANNOTATED MODEL RULES].
72. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 8.2(a).
73. The ABA identifies California, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, and Oregon
as not having adopted some version of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. ABA
Center for Professional Responsibility, Dates ofAdoption, supra note 70. With the exceptions of
California and Maine, which never adopted the Model Code or the Model Rules, the other five
states follow the Model Code. ABA/BNA, LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT 01:3-7
(2003) [hereinafter LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT].
74. MODELCODE, supra note 38, atDR 8-102(A) & (B). The Model Code explains: "While
a lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize such officials publicly, he should be certain of the
merit of his complaint, use appropriate language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and
intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence in our legal system." Id. at EC 8-6. The
Model Code's "knowingly" standard "has been interpreted by many courts as encompassing the
reckless disregard standard found in the [Model] Rules." LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L
CONDUCT, supra note 73, at 101:602.
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 114 (2000) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]. A comment to the Restatement argues that special protection should not apply
to nonjudicial public legal officials, which could be interpreted to include prosecutors or other
government attorneys, because, unlike judges, such lawyers are not constrained from publicly
responding to charges and can defend themselves. Id. at cmt. b.
76. Id. at cmt. a. But cf Polk v. State Bar of Tex., 374 F. Supp. 784, 788 (N.D. Tex. 1974)
(finding that a statement made by a lawyer who was also a defendant in a pending action did not
warrant discipline because the statement was made in the lawyer's capacity as a private citizen).
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ongoing or pending trial, could also be disciplined as conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice.77
Nevertheless, ethics rules cannot punish activity protected by the First
Amendment, even if the attorney violates an ethics rule the attorney swore to
obey when admitted to the bar.7 The Supreme Court has held that an attorney
remains free under the First Amendment to criticize laws, including the efficacy
and administration of laws controlling judicial power.79 Lawyers are also free
to allege a judge's error in interpreting the law."0 Similarly, a lawyer facing
civil or criminal liability for an out-of-court false statement criticizing a judge
cannot be found liable unless the false statement was made with a high degree
of awareness of its probable falsity, the same standard used to determine if a
nonlawyer defamed a judge.8 '
The Court has never decided, however, the degree of First Amendment
protection that applies to attorneys facing professional discipline for false
criticism of a member of the judiciary. In lawyer discipline cases involving
criticism ofjudges, a majority of courts have adopted an objective standard of
intent.8 2 Under this standard, a lawyer may be disciplined where his conduct

77. See MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 8.4(d); MODEL CODE, supra note 38, at DR 1102(A)(5); LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT, supranote 73, at 101:601 ("A lawyer may

not criticize the judiciary or its officers during an ongoing trial or the pendency of a case if such
conduct would interfere with the fair administration ofjustice."). False accusations also might be
viewed under the Model Rules and Model Code as misconduct involving dishonesty or
misrepresentation, see MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 8.4(c); MODEL CODE, supra note 38,
at DR 1-102(A)(4), and under the Model Code as conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's
fitness to practice law, see MODEL CODE, supra note 38, at DR 1-102(A)(6).
78. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1054 (1991). For an extensive discussion
of how the First Amendment applies to the speech of attorneys, see W. Bradley Wendel, Free
Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305 (2001).
79. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 646 (1985); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 631-32 (1959);
accord State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958,965 (Okla. 1988). "To say that 'the
law is an ass, a idiot' is not to impugn the character of those who must administer it." Sawyer, 360
U.S. at 634.
80. Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 635 ("The public attribution of honest error to the judiciary is no
cause for professional discipline in this country."). In contrast, nonspeech conduct of lawyers,
even where related to alleged injustice or judicial misconduct, is not protected by the First
Amendment. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 71, at 591 ("First Amendment protection,
whatever its precise contours, has not been extended to a lawyer's nonspeech conduct."); see also
Eisenberg v. Boardman, 302 F. Supp. 1360, 1364-65 (W.D. Wis. 1969) (holding that a lawyer's
threatening and harassing conduct against a judge was not protected by the First Amendment,
although the lawyer's derogatory statements against the judge were protected).
81. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
82. RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 114 reporter's note cmt. b (citing In re Palmisano, 70
F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 1990); In re Westfall, 808
S.W.2d 829 (Mo. 1991); In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1991)). InIn reJohnson, 729 P.2d
1175 (Kan. 1986), the court gave two reasons why the "actual malice" standard used in libel cases
should not apply to lawyer discipline cases: (1) those libel cases dealt with the constitutional
privilege afforded to the press, while an attorney, as an individual, has no similar right, and (2)
it is widely recognized that neither civil nor criminal liability is necessary to maintain a

Published by Scholar Commons, 2004

17

South Carolina
LawCAROLINA
Review, Vol.
55, REVIEW
Iss. 2 [2004], Art. [Vol.
4
SOUTH
LAW
55: 253

was a departure from reasonably prudent conduct, even if the lawyer did not
know the statements were false.83 The question is what a reasonable attorney,
in light of her professional functions, would do in similar circumstances.8 4 It is
the reasonableness of the belief of the statement's truth, not the state of mind
of the attorney, that is determinative. 5
In contrast, a minority of cases have adopted the subjective libel standard,
which is used for statements about public officials and public figures, to
determine whether a lawyer should be disciplined for false statements
criticizing the judiciary. 6 Under this "actual malice" standard of New York
Times v. Sullivan, the disciplinary authority would have to show that the lawyer
either knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard of the
statement's falsity. 7 Reckless disregard means that a statement was made with
a "high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity,"8 8 or that the speaker
"entertained serious doubts as to the truth"89 of the statement. The Restatement
of the Law of Governing Lawyers argues that because lawyers are especially
situated to assess the performance of judges and because judges are public
officials, the subjective actual malice standard applied to false criticism of other
public officials should also apply in lawyer discipline cases.90
As a final note, the ethics rules regarding criticism of judges, other legal
officers, and candidates forjudicial office apply only to false assertions of fact,
not to opinions.9 Nonetheless, where the attorney's statement of opinion

disciplinary action. Id. at 1181.
83. By imposing discipline even where the attorney may have believed the allegation to be
true, the objective standard applies a lesser standard of constitutional review to lawyer
disciplinary actions than to the review of restrictions placed on the speech of nonlawyers. See
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
84. United States Dist. Ct. v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 1993); Graham, 453
N.W.2d at 322.
85. Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d at 34; see also Fla. Bar v. Ray, 797 So. 2d 556, 558 (Fla. 2001)
(rejecting attorney's defense that he had an objectively reasonable basis in fact for the false
accusations); La. State Bar Ass'n v. Karst, 428 So. 2d 406,410 (La. 1983) (rejecting the argument
that the lawyer's good faith, subjective belief in the truth of the allegation excused his reckless
disregard for the truth).
86. See, e.g., In re Green, II P.3d 1078, 1083-85 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) (holding that
courts should look for false statements accompanied with actual malice when determining the
discipline ofattorneys who criticizejudges). But see Palmisano,70 F.3d at487 (stating that under
the subjective standard, an attorney could not attack a judge with the same minimal attention to
the truth of the allegations as an ordinary citizen could in attacking a political officeholder).
87. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
88. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657,667 (1989) (quoting
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)).
89. Id. (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)).
90. RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 114 cmt. b.
91. ANNOTATED MODEL RuLES, supra note 71, at 589; see also Standing Comm. on
Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that there is a constitutional
privilege to expressions of opinion); Green, 11 P.3d at 1084 (same); Owen v. Carr, 497 N.E.2d
1145, 1148 (Ill. 1986) (same).
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implies a false assertion of fact that is capable of being proved true or false, it
loses its First Amendment protection.92 Thus, as lawyers, law professors have
a First Amendment right to speak out against unjust laws or erroneous judicial
decisions and to express opinions that do not imply false assertions of fact
about the qualifications and integrity ofjudicial officials. However, they cannot
make statements about judges that they know to be false or that are made with
reckless disregard as to the statement's truth or falsity.
When a law professor participates in the investigation or litigation of a
case, the parties' and judicial system's interests in having a fair trial place
additional restrictions on the professor's right to speak out. Generally,
comments by the press or public on pending litigation can only be restricted
upon a showing of a "clear and present danger" of harm to the proceeding.93
Model Rule 3.6, however, prohibits a lawyer who participates in a matter from
making an extrajudicial statement "that the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know" will be publicly disseminated and has "a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."94 The Model Code, using
lists of prohibited and permitted statements, also prohibits extrajudicial
statements by lawyers participating in adjudications where a "reasonable person
would expect [the statements] to be disseminated by means of public
' The
communication."95
Restatement, following the Model Rules, prohibits
statements to the media about a matter pending before a tribunal where there
is a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing jurors or influencing

92. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438; Green, 11 P.3d at 1084. "Even a statement cast in the form

of an opinion ('I think that Judge X is dishonest') implies a factual basis, and the lack of support
for that implied factual assertion may be a proper basis for a penalty." In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d
483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)). However,
"a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably
false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection." Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
93. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession:
Constraintson Lawyers' FirstAmendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 569, 573 (1998); see
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Va., 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
375, 385 (1962).
94. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 17, at R. 3.6(a). The Model Rules and Restatement
additionally prohibit prosecutors, as well as others assisting the prosecutor in a criminal case,
from making extrajudicial comments that heighten public condemnation of the accused. Id. at R.
3.8(0; RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 109(2). Both the Model Rules and Restatement provide
an exception for statements necessary to inform the public about the prosecutor's actions and
serving a legitimate law-enforcement purpose. Id.
95. MODEL CODE, supra note 38, at DR 7-107(A)-(H). The language of Model Code DR

7-107 is considered "less protective of lawyer speech than Model Rule 3.6, in that it applies a
'reasonable likelihood ofprejudice' standard." Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1068
(1991). Professors Hazard and Hodes note that because of the Model Code's "lists" approach,
"[p]ractically every court that considered constitutional challenges to DR 7-107 said that the rule
was overbroad." GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 32.4 (3d ed. 2003).
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witnesses.96 Recognizing the importance to the public of informed commentary
and the small likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding from a lawyer who is not
involved, the trial publicity restrictions apply only to lawyers, and their
associates, who are or have been involved in the case.97
Restrictions on trial publicity reflect a concern that while the public and the
media have a right to information about cases, the parties have an interest in
preventing out-of-court statements from interfering with the fair adjudication
of the case.9" Yet, because trial publicity restrictions interfere with the
attorney's right of free expression, the Supreme Court has carefully scrutinized
such limitations. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, the Court reviewed
disciplinary sanctions against an attorney who, upon his client's indictment on
theft charges, held a press conference at which he challenged the evidence in
99
the case and suggested that the likely thief was a police detective. The Court

held that Nevada's prohibition on attorney speech that will have a "substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding"'" was
permissible under the First Amendment, explicitly refusing to require the more
demanding clear and present danger of actual prejudice or imminent threat
standard used for regulation of the press during pending proceedings.'01
Nevertheless, the Court did find that Nevada's trial publicity rule was void
for vagueness. Its safe harbor provision, allowing a lawyer to state the general
nature of the defense, failed to provide attorneys with sufficient guidance as to
the limits of permissible speech.'0 2 The Court further held that an attorney may

96. RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 109(1).
97. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 3.6 cmt. 3; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 75,
§ 109 cmt. b (observing that an advocate's right of free expression is less than those of nonlawyers
or of lawyers not involved in the proceeding).
98. RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 109 cmt. b. Although the trial publicity restrictions
apply to civil and criminal proceedings, as well as to jury and nonjury cases, the nature of the
proceedings is relevant in determining possible prejudice. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R.
3.6 cmt. 6. Criminal trials are the most sensitive to extrajudicial speech, with nonjury proceedings
and arbitrations being the least. Id.; see also Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1077
(1991) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the substantial risk of the material prejudice test
"will rarely be met where the judge is the trier of fact, since trial judges often have access to
inadmissible and highly prejudicial information and are presumed to be able to discount or
disregard it"); RESTATEMENT, supranote 75, § 109 cmt. b ("Thus, media comments by a lawyer
outside a nonjury proceeding will pose a significant and direct threat to the administration of
justice and thus warrant application of the rule [restricting comments on pending adjudications]
only in extreme situations.").
99. 501 U.S. at 1033, 1059-60.
100. Id. at 1069 n.4 (quoting NEv. Sup. CT. R.177(l)).
101. Id. at 1074-75. Some states still require the more demanding showing of a clear and
present danger or serious and imminent threat to the judicial proceeding before restricting a
lawyer's statements about a pending case. LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note
73, at 61:1005-07 (citing Colorado, District of Columbia, Illinois, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oregon, and Virginia).
102. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048 (quoting NEV. SuP. CT. R.177(3)(a)).
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take reasonable steps prior to trial to defend a client's reputation and reduce the
adverse consequences of an indictment, including an attempt to demonstrate to
the public that the client is innocent.'0 a Hence, notwithstanding the restriction
on statements that have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the
proceeding, the Model Rules and the Restatement recognize the lawyer's right
to "make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to
protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity
not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client."'"
As a final cautionary note on laws affecting the right of a law professor to
speak out, a law professor may become a "public figure" by participating in a
public debate about the law, legal system, or judicial officials. Public figures
include those who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
05
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved."'
Public figures and those who hold public office may only recover for injury to
reputation on clear and convincing proof of "actual malice," the more stringent
libel standard. " Thus,by speaking out publicly, and thereby accepting "certain
'
necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs,"' 07
a law
professor runs the risk of being subjected to false statements against her that
she can only address by proving that the speaker made the allegation with a
high degree of awareness of its probable falsity or with serious doubts as to its
truth.10 8

103. Id. at 1043.
104. MODEL RULEs, supra note 17, at R. 3.6(c) & cmt. 7; RESTATEMENT, supra note 75,
§ 109(1).
A law professor participating in a trial may also be subject to a gag order issued by the trial
judge to prevent the participants from speaking with the media about the case. The Court has not
determined whether the showing necessary to impose such prior restraints on attorney speech is
a reasonable or substantial likelihood of harm or the more stringent standard of clear and present
danger or serious and imminent threat. ANNOTATED MODELRULES, supranote 71, at 378; Erwin
Chemerinsky, Silence is Not Golden: ProtectingLawyer Speech Under the First Amendment,
47 EMORY L.J. 859, 876 (1998). As in the case of other prior restraints on speech, a gag order
should be narrowly tailored and "no broader than necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial
system and the defendant's right to a fair trial." United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445,447 (2d
Cir. 1993) (citing Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075). The trial court also must explore whether other less
restrictive alternatives would effectively avoid or mitigate the prejudicial publicity. Id.; Levine
v. United States Dist. Ct., 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1985); Twohig v. Blackmer, 918 P.2d 332,
337 (N.M. 1996).
105. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). Public figures also include
those who have assumed roles of special prominence in the affairs of society and those who
occupy positions of persuasive power and influence. Id.
106. See id. at 342.
107. Id. at 344.
108. Laurie L. Levenson, Reportingthe Rodney King Trial: The Role ofLegal Experts, 27
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 649, 665-66 (1994). But cf.Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55
(1976) (rejecting the argument that a person became a public figure by exercising the right to
resort to the judicial process to obtain a highly publicized divorce).
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LEGAL PROFESSION PRECEPTS ON A LAWYER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES TO
SPEAK OUT

Most law professors also are attorneys and are guided by various norms of
the legal profession. Among the legal profession's longstanding norms are the
responsibilities of all lawyers to lend their time and civic influence to assure the
availability of legal services and to advance law reform.
A. The Duty of ProBono Publico Service
The notion that an American lawyer's professional duties include the
representation of those who cannot afford to pay for legal services can be traced
back at least to the 1836 treatise of Baltimore attorney David Hoffman. In his
Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, Hoffman states
"[t]hose who have none, and who have just causes, are, of all others, the best
entitled to sue, or be defended; and they shall receive a due portion of my
services, cheerfully given."' 9 The 1854 publication of Judge George
Sharswood's lectures on professionalism argued "[tihere are many cases, in
which it will be his duty, perhaps more properly his privilege, to work for
nothing.""' Similarly, the 1850 Field Code, adopted by twenty-two states to
govern the admission and regulation of attorneys, listed among the eight duties
oflawyers "never to reject, for any consideration personal to [myself], the cause
of the defenseless or the oppressed."' " The first ethical code, Alabama's 1887
Code of Legal Ethics, likewise stated that a client's inability to pay for the
attorney's services may require a charge of nothing at all and that an attorney
"should always be a friend to the defenseless and oppressed."".2

109. HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGALETHICS 342 (1953) (including the resolutions from DAVID
HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (2d ed. 1836)).
110. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONALETHICS (5th ed. 1854), reprinted

in 32 A.B.A. REP. 1, 151 (1907). "It is to be hoped, that the time will never come, at this or any
other Bar in this country, when a poor man with an honest cause, though without a fee, cannot
obtain the services of honorable counsel, in the prosecution or defence of his rights." Id.
Hoffman's and Sharswood's works were, in effect, the first American professional creeds and the
bases for the first state ethics code, the 1887 Alabama Code, and the 1908 ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics. James E. Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds and Moral Seismography, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 781,787-90 (1997).
111. See, e.g., COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING, THE CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK-NEw YORK FIELD CODES 1850-1865, VOL I, 205

(1998) (including the language in § 511(8) of the Field Code). The explanatory notes to the code
explain that the duties were taken substantially from a Swiss oath that required a lawyer, inter

alia, "not to reject, for any considerations personal to myself, the cause of the weak, the stranger,
or the oppressed." Id. at 205.
112. ALABAMA STATE BAR ASS'N, CODE OF ETHICS, Rs. 48, 56 (1887), reprintedin
DRINKER, supra note 109, at 361-63.
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The ABA's first statement of ethical principles, the 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics (ABA Canons), stated that a client's poverty may require
the client to pay nothing at all for the lawyer's services and that a lawyer
appointed to represent an indigent prisoner "ought not to ask to be excused for
any trivial reason, and should always exert his best efforts in his behalf."' 3 At
the same time it developed the Canons, the ABA adopted a proposed oath of
admission containing the general principles that should control a lawyer's
practice and violation ofwhich could result in disbarment. "4 The lawyer's oath
provided, "I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed.""'
The ABA's more recent rules of professional responsibility expand on this
historical norm of assisting in the availability of legal services. One of the nine
canons of the Model Code declares that "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal
Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available."" 6 Noting
that "[t]he fair administration of justice requires the availability of competent
lawyers," the Model Code proclaims that "persons unable to pay for legal
services should be provided needed services. ' "17 The Model Code explains that
the responsibility to provide legal services to persons unable to pay rests with
the individual lawyer who, "regardless of professional prominence or
professional workload, should find time to participate in serving the
disadvantaged.""' Every attorney also is expected to support efforts of the
profession to meet the need for free legal services.' 9
The preamble to the Model Rules explains the special responsibilities of
a lawyer as a public citizen and as a member of the legal profession. 2 ' As a

113. ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canons 4, 12 (1908) [hereinafter ABA CANONS].
Lawyers also are reminded, "In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the profession is a
branch of the administration ofjustice and not a mere money-getting trade." Id. at Canon 12.
114. ABA OATH OF ADMISSION (1908), reprintedin 34 ABA REP. 1169-70 (1909).
115. Id. at 1170. A 1935 ABA ethics opinion endorsed the voluntary efforts of attorneys to
defend citizens unable to retain counsel when the citizens believed their constitutional rights were
imperiled. ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 148 (1935); see also ABA
Comm. on Prof I Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 191 (1939) ("Free legal clinics carried on
by the organized bar... serve a very worthwhile purpose and should be encouraged.").
116. MODEL CODE, supra note 38, at Canon 2; see also id. at EC 2-1 (stating that an
important function ofthe legal profession is to assist in making legal services fully available). The
Model Code's Canons are described as "statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general
terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the
public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession." Id. at prelim. statement.
117. Id. at EC 8-3.
118. Id. at EC 2-25.
119. Id.; see also MODEL CODE, supra noe 38, at EC 2-16 (repeating that "persons unable
to pay all or a portion of a reasonable fee should be able to obtain necessary legal services, and
lawyers should support and participate in ethical activities designed to achieve that objective")
(citations omitted).
120. MODEL RuLES, supra note 17, at pmbl. 1 1.
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citizen, a lawyer should seek to improve the law, the administration ofjustice,
and access to the legal system.' 2 ' As a member of the legal profession,
[a] lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the
administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and
sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate
legal assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should devote
professional time and resources and use civic influence to
ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who
because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure
adequate legal counsel. A lawyer should aid the legal
profession in pursuing these objectives .... 2
Model Rule 6.1 codifies this pro bono responsibility by declaring that
"[e]very lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to
those unable to pay."' 23 When unable to engage in pro bono services, a lawyer
may discharge her individual ethical commitment by giving financial support
to organizations that provide free legal assistance to persons of limited
means.' 24 In addition to either providing direct pro bono services or making a
financial contribution when that service is not feasible, the Model Rules expect
every lawyer to give financial support to government and professional programs
25
that provide free legal services to those with limited means.' The Model Rules
also urge law firms "to act reasonably to enable and encourage all lawyers in
6.1.126
the firm to provide the pro bono services called for" by Rule
The Model Rules further promote pro bono work by easing conflict of
interest restrictions on lawyers who participate as nonemployees in legal
services organizations. Lawyers who serve as officers or members of legal
services organizations do not establish an attorney-client relationship with those
served by the organization, and therefore, may participate in the organization
legal services to persons having interests adverse
even though it provides free
27
to a client of the lawyer.

121. Id. atpmbl. 6.
122. Id. The preamble also states that a lawyer, "guided by personal conscience and the
approbation of professional peers," should strive "to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of
public service." Id. at pmbl. 7.
123. Id. at R. 6.1. The 1993 amendments to Model Rule 6.1 set a pro bono publico service
goal for each lawyer of at least fifty hours per year. Id.
124. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 6.1 cmt. 9.
125. Id. atR. 6.1 cmt. 10.
126. Id. at R. 6.1 cmt. 11.
127. Id. at R. 6.3 & cmt. 1. Although "legal services organization" is not defined in the
Model Rules, other uses of the term indicate that it "should be construed to apply to pro bono
organizations that provide legal services for indigents." ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supranote
71, at 519-20. The rule assumes that the lawyer will not be acting as lawyer for the legal services
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Participation in certain decisions or actions of a legal services organization
may be limited by the lawyer's obligations to a private client under conflict of
interest rules. 2 The ABA recently amended the Model Rules to ease conflict
of interest restrictions for lawyers participating in nonprofit or court-sponsored
programs that provide short-term limited legal services to a client, such as
advice or completion of legal forms, in which there is no expectation by either
side that the lawyer will provide continuing representation.' 29
Thus, historic and current codes of the legal profession impose a
responsibility on lawyers to render pro bono service to those otherwise unable
to secure legal representation. 3 ' This pro bono norm is based on two notions.'13
First, it is imperative that all persons, including the poor, have access to the
legal system. Without such access, basic rights cannot be asserted or defended
and a justice system built on the notion of equal justice for all cannot retain

legitimacy. 32 Second, because of the complexity of the legal process and the
bar's monopoly on legal services, meaningful access to the legal system
requires the assistance of attorneys. 33 As the ABA and AALS's Joint
Conference on Professional Responsibility observed, the ideal of equality
before the law "remains an empty form of words unless the legal profession is
ready to provide adequate representation for those unable to pay the usual
fees."

134

organization or its clients and assumes that the clients of the organization will be served by staff
lawyers. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 95, § 52.2.
128. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 6.3(a); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 75,
§ 135 cmt. e.
129. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 6.5. These short-term limited legal services
programs include pro se counseling programs and legal-advice clinics and hotlines. Id. at cmt.
I.
130. For an analysis of the history and changing nature of lawyers' pro bono
responsibilities, see Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers' Pro Bono
Responsibilities: From Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 TUL L. REV. 91
(2002).
13 1. Tigran W. Eldred & Thomas Schoenherr, The Lawyer's Duty ofPublic Service: More
Than Charity?, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 367, 394 (1993-1994) (citing DAVID LuBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 237-66 (1988)).
132. LUBAN, supra note 131, at 252-56.
133. 1d. at 244; Eldred & Schoenherr, supra note 13 1, at 395. As ChiefJustice Sol Wachtler
of the New York State Court of Appeals argued, "a justice system which allows vast disparities
in access to justice based on ability to pay cannot truly be called a system of justice at all."
Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services, Final Report to the Chief Judge of the
State of New York, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 755, 775 (1991).
134. Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, ABA & AALS, Professional
Responsibility: Report ofthe Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1216 (1958) [hereinafter Joint
Conference on Professional Responsibility]. The ABA-AALS Joint Conference concluded that
the legal profession has a clear moral obligation to see "that those already handicapped do not
suffer the cumulative disadvantage of being without proper legal representation." Id. at 1216. A
New York judicial report on the availability of legal services similarly maintained:
Our justice system cannot proclaim in the bold letters of the law that it is
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Numerous ABA ethics opinions reinforce the ethics rules' pro bono
obligations. Addressing the responsibility of lawyers to raise funds and handle
matters that can no longer be addressed by legal services office staff, ABA
Formal Opinion 347 explained that the problem of reduced availability of legal
services for indigent clients is a problem for all lawyers. 35 Finding no
uncertainties in the ethics rules as to the professional responsibility of the
individual lawyer, the 1981 Opinion stated, "[t]he legal profession has a clear
responsibility to respond by helping to obtain funds for existing legal services
programs and by providing free legal services to indigent clients who would be
served by legal services offices were funding available.' 3 6 Later, in a 1996
ethics opinion, the ABA argued that the responsibility to provide legal services
to indigent clients "lies not only with legal services lawyers but with the legal
profession as a whole.' '137 The ethics committee contended that all lawyers must
be prepared to provide extraordinary pro bono services to persons who, because
of reductions in government funding or restrictions on goverment-finded
138
cases, are no longer eligible for legal services representation.
The oaths of admission of lawyers in a number of states reinforce the pro
bono imperatives of ethics rules by requiring newly-admitted members of the
bar to swear to "never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed."' 39 Similarly, some states impose general
statutory duties on attorneys that include the duty not to reject, for personal
reasons, the defenseless or oppressed."4
The significance of the Model Rules' pro bono norm is also confirmed by
the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE). The MPRE,
which seeks to "measure the examinee's knowledge and understanding of

just, but then block access to justice. We cannot promise due process, but
raise insurmountable odds for those who seek it. Nor can we say that we
stand for equality before the law, but honor this right only for those who can
afford to pay their own way. To give with one hand and take away with the
other is mean deception.
Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services, supra note 133, at 779.
135. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 347 (1981).
136. Id.
137. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 399 (1996).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 2.48.210 (2003); MICH. Sup. Cr. R. 15 §3 (2002);
In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar 1-3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial Admin. 2.065
(Legal Aid), 573 So. 2d 800,803 (Fla.1990) (quoting Rules Relating to Ethics Governing Bench
& Bar, 145 Fla. 763, 797 (1941)); La. Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, The
La4yer 's Oath, availableathttp://www.lascba.orglawyers oath.asp (last visited Dec. 19,2003);
see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6067, 6068(h) (2003) ("Never to reject, for any
consideration personal to himself or herself, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.").
140. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-3-20(7) (2002); GA. CODEANN. § 15-19-4(6) (2001); IOWA

CODE ANN. § 602.10112(7) (2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 481.06(6) (2002); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 9.460(4) (2001).
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established standards related to a lawyer's professional conduct,"'' is required
for admission to the bars of forty-seven states and the District of Columbia. 42
Among the established standards that an examinee is expected to know is the
responsibility of a lawyer to improve the legal system, 43 including Model Rule
6. I's pro bono responsibilities.'"
Beyond the formal rules of ethics that govern lawyer conduct, notions of
professionalism encompass pro bono publico service. Although the concept of
lawyer professionalism remains elusive, Dean Roscoe Pound's often-quoted
interpretation described it as "pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the
spirit of a public service."1 45 Expanding on Pound's interpretation, the ABA's
Professionalism Committee defined a "professional lawyer," in part, as one
acting "in the spirit of public service ...

as part of a common calling to

promote justice and public good."'" Invoking this definition, bar assbciation
reports on improving lawyer professionalism repeatedly call on all members of
their obligation to, and increase their participation in, pro
the bar to recognize
47
bono activities.

For example, the ABA's 1992 MacCrate Report on professional
development listed "Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality," which
includes ensuring that legal services are available to those unable to pay, as one
of the legal profession's four fundamental values.

48

In 2000, the ABA's House

141. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR ExAMINERS, THE MPRE: 2003 INFORMATION
BOOKLET 30 (2002).
142. Id. at 2.

143. See id. at 33, 35.
144. See RICHARD C. WYDICK, BARBRIBARREVIEW: PROFESSIONALRESPONSiBiLITY 106
(2000) (including the obligations of Model Rule 6.1 in the materials designed to prepare the reader
for the MPRE).
145. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953).
Professor Roger Cramton argues that one of the chief elements of a renewed vision of legal
professionalism will be a "lawyer who cares about equal access to justice." Roger C. Cramton,
Delivery of Legal Services to OrdinaryAmericans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 611 (1994).
146. ABA SECTION OF LEGALEDUC. &ADMISSIONS TOTHEBAR, TEACHINGAND LEARNING
PROFESSIONALISM 6 (1996) [hereinafter TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM]. The
Committee also declared the following: "In short, public service is not merely an aspiration or
an ideology. It is the very essence of being a lawyer in our society." Id.
147. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, ".... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 15,47-50 (1986),
reprintedin 112 F.R.D. 243 (1987) (discussing the goal that lawyers recognize their obligation
to participate in and increase their participation in pro bono activities); AALS COMM'N ON PRO
BONO AND PUB. SERV. OPPORTUNITIES, LEARNING TO SERVE 22 (1999) [hereinafter LEARNING
TO SERVE], availableat http://www.aals.org/probono/report.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2003).
148. See ABA SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONALDEELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 140-41(1992) [hereinafter MacCrate
Report]. The MacCrate Report notes that it is "now well-accepted that all lawyers bear aprobono
obligation." Id. at 214.
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of Delegates identified the duty to promote access to justice as one of the six
core values of the profession.'49
Similarly, a number of professionalism codes or creeds include pro bono
pledges. The ABA's creed of professionalism and accompanying pledge direct
a lawyer to remember that his responsibilities as a lawyer include a devotion to
public service and to pledge to contribute uncompensated time and resources
to persons who cannot afford adequate legal assistance. 5 ' State professionalism
ideals and pledges likewise include a commitment to public good and access
to legal services, 5 ' as do the stated ideals of lawyer professionalism
organizations such as the American Inns of Court.'52
While not ignoring the nonlegal charitable and civic activities contributed
by members of the bar, pro bono norms focus on the "specific need for
particular services that only lawyers can provide and for which other kinds of
selfless activity by lawyers are not practical substitutes."' 53 Acceptable pro
bono work consists of the full range of legal services needed by persons of
limited means.' 54 The latest version of the Model Rules expects that a

149. ABA House of Delegates, Resolution 1OF (July 11, 2000), reprinted in L. Harold
Levinson, CollaborationBetween Lawyers and Others: Copingwith the ABA Model Rules After
Resolution IOF, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 133, app. at 164-65 (2001).
150. ABA House of Delegates, A Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism (Aug. 9, 1988),
reprintedin PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 691,694 (John S.

Dzienkowski ed., 2003-2004); ABA, Lawyer's Pledge of Professionalism(1988), reprinted in
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supra at 694. The
professionalism pledge of the ABA's Young Lawyers Division contains a similar pledge to
contribute time and resources to pro bono activities and to work to make the legal system more
accessible. ABA Young Lawyers Division, Lawyer's Pledge of Professionalism (1988),
reprinted in ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY,

COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STANDARDS 393 (2003 ed.).
151. See, e.g., Center for Professionalism, The Florida Bar, Ideals and Goals of
Professionalism (1990), at http://www.flabar.org (last visited Dec. 19, 2003) (including a
commitment "to provide all persons, regardless of their means or popularity of their causes, with
access to the law and the judicial system"); Supreme Court of Texas and Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, The Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism (1989), reprinted in
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supra note 150, at 697-98
(committing a lawyer "to assure that all persons have access to competent representation
regardless of wealth or position in life" and "to an adequate and effective pro bono program").
152. American Inns of Court, ProfessionalCreed,availableat http://www.innsofcourt.org/
contentviewer.asp?breadcrumb=6,9,342 (last visited Dec. 19, 2003) (including pledge to
"contribute time and resources to public service ... and pro bono work").
153. ABA COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 147, at 48 n.*. As two authors

explained, "Rule 6.1 and all of its predecessors apply only to the provision of legal services.
While it is admirable for lawyers to serve their community in a variety of ways, community
service stems from a more general obligation that belongs to all citizens and not solely to
lawyers." James L. Baillie & Judith Bernstein-Baker, In the Spirit ofPublicService: ModelRule
6.1, The Profession, and Legal Education, 13 LAW & INEQ. 51, 61 (1994).
154. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 6.1 cmt. 2 (including "individual and class
representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative lobbying, administrative rule making and
the provision of free training or mentoring to those who represent persons of limited means" as
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substantial portion of the pro bono legal services rendered annually should be
to financially disadvantaged individuals or to organizations that serve those of
limited means.' As one author argued, the legal needs of those without
financial resources are often derived specifically from their poverty status and
"may involve the essentials of life, making representation more vital for the
poor than middle-class citizens. ",156
Therefore, there can be little debate that pro bono publico service is a
longstanding and fundamental norm of the legal profession. However, despite
repeated calls for mandatory pro bono service, such activity is a voluntary,
aspirational goal in state ethics rules' 57 and is not enforced through disciplinary
action. "8 Some states' statutory duties and oaths of admission directing lawyers
not to reject the cause of the defenseless or oppressed are mandatory and could,
if violated, subject the lawyer to sanctions."19 Nonetheless, there does not

examples of the pro bono legal services endorsed by the rule).
155. Id. at Rule 6.1(a). The pre-1993 version of Model Rule 6.1, still in effect in many
states, did not favor pro bono service to persons of limited means over assistance to public service
or charitable organizations seeking social change. ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, supra
note 150, at 510. Instead, it shadowed the 1975 ABA House of Delegates resolution that each
lawyer should provide public interest legal services, defined as services provided for free or at a
substantially reduced fee, in poverty law, civil rights law, public rights law, charitable
organization representation, and administration of justice. Proceedings of the 1975 Annual
Meeting of the House of Delegates, 100 REP. A.B.A. 642, 684-85 (1975) (reprinting the
"Montreal Resolution").
156. Deborah M. Weissman, Law as Largess: Shifting ParadigmsofLaw for the Poor,44
WM. & MARY L. REv. 737, 750 n.60 (citing Ronald H. Silverman, Conceiving a Lawyer's Legal
Duty to the Poor, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 885, 900-01 (1991)). Professor Charles Wolfram
observed that what some lawyers consider to be pro bono legal services often advance new client
development, seek to create goodwill with judges or other attorneys, or consist of volunteer work
for groups or bar committees that do not address the unmet legal needs of the poor. CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 16.9 (1986); see also Carolyn Elefant, Can Law FirmsDo
Pro Bono? A Skeptical View ofLaw Firms 'Pro Bono Programs,16 J. LEGAL PROF. 95, 102-03
(1991) (arguing that law firms use pro bono work to develop profitable business contacts); Esther
F. Lardent, MandatoryPro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the Right Question, 49
MD. L. REv. 78, 92 (1990) (arguing that volunteer lawyer pro bono programs focus on simple
matters and on cases not involving mainstream poverty law issues); Norman W. Spaulding, The
Prophet and the Bureaucrat: PositionalConflicts in Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1395, 1420 (1998) (arguing that paying clients often influence a firm's pro bono work, with
unpopular clients and causes going without assistance).
157. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 6.1 (setting forth the "responsibility" of
every lawyer to provide pro bono publico legal service but conditioning that responsibility with
the terms "should" and "aspire"); MODEL CODE, supra note 38, at EC 2-25, 8-3 (limiting the
"responsibility," "obligation," and "duty" of attorneys to make legal counsel available to those
unable to pay by using the term "should" and by excluding pro bono duties from the Disciplinary
Rules).
158. See MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 6.1 cmt. 12 ("The responsibility set forth in
this Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.").
159. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-3-87(3) (2002) (subjecting attorneys to removal or suspension for rejecting the cause of the defenseless or oppressed for consideration personal to
themselves); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6103 (2003) (subjecting attorneys to suspension or
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appear to be any reported case of an attorney sanctioned for violating this
aspect of an attorney's duties or oath.
B. The Duty Not to Deny Representationto UnpopularClientsor Causes
Related to the idea that justice requires that all persons have access to the
legal system is the additional professional standard that legal representation
should not be denied to persons or causes that are controversial. The 1850 Field
Code, the 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics, the ABA's 1908 Oath of Admission,
and other state oaths vow not to allow the "oppressed" to go unrepresented. 60
The Model Code states that the legal profession's objective of making legal
services fully available requires that "[r]egardless of his personal feelings, a
lawyer should not decline representation because a client or a cause is
unpopular or community reaction is adverse."' 6 1 Thus, the "preference of a
lawyer to avoid adversary alignment against judges, other lawyers, public
officials, or influential members of the community," "the repugnance of the
subject matter of the proceeding," or "the identity or position of a person
involved in the case" does not justify refusing to provide legal assistance.' 62
The Model Rules continue this professional duty to help ensure access of
unpopular clients or causes to legal assistance. A comment to Model Rule 1.2
states that "[1]egal representation should not be denied to people who are
unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject
of popular disapproval."' 63 Thus, one way lawyers can ensure equal access to
the justice system for all those who, because of social barriers, cannot secure

disbarment for violating their oath or duties); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-61-301(2)(b) (2003)
(same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.48.220(3) (2003) (same).
160. See supra notes 111-15, 139-40 and accompanying text.
161. MODEL CODE, supranote 38, at EC 2-26 to -27.
162. Id. at EC 2-28 to -29 (citations omitted); see also id. at EC 2-30 ("Likewise, a lawyer
should decline employment if the intensity of his personal feeling, as distinguished from a
community attitude, may impair his effective representation of a prospective client.").
163. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 1.2 cmt. 5. Rule 1.2(b) provides one rationale for
the obligation not to refuse unpopular clients or causes - "A lawyer's representation of a client,
including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's
political, economic, social or moral views or activities." Id. at R. 1.2(b). See generallyHAZARD
&HODES, supranote 95, § 5.8 n. 1 (concluding that "[p]rofessional detachment is often discussed
in terms of a principle of'neutrality' or 'nonaccountability"'); WOLFRAM,supra note 156, § 10.2
(discussing professional detachment and unpopular clients and causes); Andre A. Borgeas, Note,
Necessary Adherence to Model Rule 1.2(b): Attorneys Do Not Endorse the Acts or Views of
Their Clients by Virtue ofRepresentation, 13 GEO. J.LEGALETHICs 761,761 (2000) (concluding
"[l]awyers are agents ... not principals, and they should not be criticized for the clients whom
they represent") (citing Abe Fortas, Thurman Arnold and The Theaterof the Law, 79 YALE L. J.
988, 1002 (1970)).
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adequate legal counsel is by representing indigent or unpopular clients.1"
Similarly, a lawyer shall not seek to decline a court appointment just because
the client or the cause is controversial or repugnant to the lawyer. 65 Instead,
good cause to decline an appointment exists only where the lawyer finds the
client or cause
so repugnant as likely to impair the attorney-client
66
relationship.
ABA ethics opinions repeatedly remind members of the bar, and law
school faculty in particular, about their obligation not to reject the

representation of controversial clients or causes. In a rebuke to a local bar
association that wanted a legal aid society to avoid representation of "militant"
groups and causes, ABA Formal Opinion 324 stated that attorney members of
a legal aid society's board of directors, just like individual attorneys, are bound
by "the Code of Professional Responsibility from exercising their authority so
as to discourage the representation of controversial clients and causes or
matters which would align the legal aid society against public officials,
governmental agencies or influential members of the community.' ' 67 In ABA
Informal Opinion 1208, the ABA's ethics committee addressed the propriety
of law school guidelines that sought to avoid the acceptance of controversial
cases by the school's law clinic. 68 The ethics committee declared that the
lawyers on the governing body of a law school clinic, which includes a law
school's nonclinical faculty and dean, should avoid adopting guidelines that

164. MODEL RULEs, supra note 17, at R. 6.2 cmt. 1 ("An individual lawyer fulfills this
responsibility [to provide pro bono publico service] by accepting a fair share of unpopular matters
or indigent or unpopular clients."); see also id. at pmbl. 6 (stressing that "all lawyers should
devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our
system ofjustice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure
adequate legal counsel").
165. See id. at R. 6.2(c). This principle is illustrated by an ethics opinion involving a
Tennessee lawyer who sought to decline a court appointment to represent minors seeking court
permission to obtain abortions. The lawyer sought to decline the appointment on the ground that
he was a devout Catholic and advocating a right to abortion would violate his ethical and moral
beliefs. Tenn. Bd. of Prof lResponsibility, Formal Op. 96-F-140 (1996). The Tennessee ethics
committee advised the attorney that where there is a conflict between the attorney's moral and
ethical beliefs and those of the client, the "lawyer must allow the court to determine the propriety
of his withdrawal after motion and hearing to develop an adequate record." Id. Only where the
attorney's beliefs or repugnance toward the client or cause are so compelling that they will impair
the attorney's independent professional judgment and ability to represent the client may the
attorney be excused from the representation or should the attorney refuse to represent an
unpopular client. See MODEL RULEs, supra note 17, at R. 6.2(c); MODEL CODE, supra note 38,
at EC 2-30.
166. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 6.2(c). "In contrast to Rule 6.1, which states an
aspirational [pro bono] goal, Rule 6.2 provides the basis for disciplinary action for a lawyer's
failure to comply with its mandate." ABA CTR. FOR PROF'LRESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATEDMODEL
RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 484 (4th ed. 1999).
167. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 324 (1970).
168. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Informal Op. 1208 (1972).
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prohibit the acceptance of controversial cases. 69 Instead, the lawyer-members
"should seek to establish guidelines that encourage, not restrict, acceptance of
controversial clients and cases," particularly if the prospective law clinic clients
would otherwise be unable to obtain legal services. 7 In a later opinion, the
ABA's ethics committee reiterated that all lawyers should seek to avoid, and
where necessary remove, unreasonable and unjustified restraints on the types
of clients and cases that may be represented by legal services offices and should
support efforts to address the public's unmet need for legal services. 7 '
Beyond ethics opinions, the ABA and AALS have spoken on the duty of
an attorney to represent unpopular causes. In 1953, the ABA House of
Delegates, in reaction to attacks on attorneys providing representation to
unpopular clients, resolved that a lawyer had a right to represent and defend any
client without being penalized by imputation of the client's reputation, views,
or character to the lawyer.' 72 The ABA vowed to support any lawyer against
such criticism and to educate the public and legal profession on a lawyer's
rights and duties in representing an unpopular client or cause.' 73 In the report
of its Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, the ABA and AALS
proclaimed that "[o]ne of the highest services the lawyer can render to society
is to appear in court on behalf of clients whose causes are in disfavor with the
general public."'7 While noting that a lawyer's decision to undertake the
representation of an unpopular cause is a matter for individual conscience, the
ABA and AALS observed that the legal profession "has a clear moral
obligation with respect to this problem." '
C. The Duty to Assist in Law Reform and Improving the Legal System
Lawyers, because of their education and experience, are particularly
qualified to recognize deficiencies in the law and administration ofjustice and
to initiate corrective measures. 7 6 As a way of advancing the public service

169. Id.
170. Id. For an analysis of the ethical issues raised by attempts to interfere in law school
clinic case and client decisions, see Kuehn & Joy, supra note 18.
171. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974).
172. Proceedings of the House ofDelegates, 78 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 133 (1953). The ABA
premised its resolution on two convictions: that the bar has a duty to provide all persons, even the
most unpopular defendants, the benefit of legal representation and that a client's views or conduct
should not be imputed to the lawyer. Id.; see also Report of the SpecialCommittee on Individual
Rights as Affected by NationalSecurity, 78 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 304, 305-06 (1953) (discussing
the public's misperception of a lawyer's duty to provide representation to unpopular clients and
causes and the ABA's need to educate the public of this duty).
173. Proceedingsof the House ofDelegates, supra note 172, at 133.
174. Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, supra note 134, at 1216.
175. Id. at 1216-17.
176. MODEL CODE, supra note 38, at EC 8-1.
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conviction of the profession, lawyers are expected to participate voluntarily in
law reform and in improving the legal system.'77
The 1908 ABA Canons encouraged lawyers to strive to improve the law
and administration ofjustice' 7 The Model Code highlights the importance of
this duty by including as one of its nine axiomatic norms that a lawyer should
help improve the legal system.'79 Thus, lawyers should aid in making needed

changes and improvements to the legal system and to laws that the lawyer
believes are unjust.'80 Lawyers can participate in efforts to improve the legal
system "without regard to the general interests or desires of clients or former
clients."''
The Model Rules continue this notion of the responsibility for the quality
ofjustice by encouraging lawyers to employ their knowledge "to improve the
law ...

and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service." '82

Beyond exhortation, the Model Rules facilitate law reform activities by
allowing lawyers to participate in organizations "involved in the reform of the
law or its administration notwithstanding
that the reform may [adversely] affect
83
the interests of a client.'

177. Id.
178. ABA CANONS, supra note 113, at Canon 29.
179. MODEL CODE, supra note 38, at Canon 8.

180. Id. at EC 8-1 to -2, -9.
181. Id. at EC 8-1. The Model Code explains:
The obligation of loyalty to his client applies only to a lawyer in the
discharge of his professional duties and implies no obligation to adopt a
personal viewpoint favorable to the interests or desires ofhis client. While
a lawyer must act always with circumspection in order that his conduct will
not adversely affect the rights of a client in a matter he is then handling, he
may take positions on public issues and espouse legal reforms he favors
without regard to the individual views of any client.
Id. at EC 7-17.
182. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at pmbl. 7; see also id. at pmbl. 1 (noting that
lawyers have a "special responsibility for the quality of justice").
183. Id. at R. 6.4. Organizations involved in law reform include those that sponsor scholarly
debate and research, assist in legislative drafting or lobbying, or file amicus briefs in their own
names. ANNOTATED MODEL RuLEs, supra note 71, at 496 (citing HAZARD & HODES, supra note
95, § 53.2).
The comment to Model Rule 6.4 explains that lawyers involved in law reform organizations
do not have an attorney-client relationship with the organization. MODEL RULES, supra note 17,
at R.6.4. cmt. 1.Nevertheless, in determining the nature and scope of participation in law reform
activities, a lawyer is warned to be mindful of obligations to clients under conflict of interest rules
and to make appropriate disclosure to the law reform organization when aware that a private client
might materially benefit from the proposed reforms. Id. But see RESTATEMENT, supra note 75,
§ 125 cmt. e (discussing the ability of a lawyer openly to express policy views inconsistent with
a client's position and the corresponding limitation on this ability).
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Ideals of professionalism likewise include a commitment to legal reform.1

The ABA and AALS's Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility
characterized legal reform as "[t]he special obligation of the profession," noting
that "few great figures in the history of the Bar . . .have not concerned
themselves with the reform and improvement of the law."' 85 The ABA's creed
and pledge of professionalism exhort lawyers to devote time to improve the
administration of justice and to make the legal system more accessible and
responsive. 8 6 The ABA's MacCrate Report argues that members of the legal
profession bear a responsibility for the quality of justice and should be
committed to the fundamental professional value of enhancing the capacity of
the law and legal institutions to provide justice.' 87 In a like manner, members
of the Inns of Court pledge to "work to make the legal system more accessible,
responsive and effective. '"188
D. The Lawyer-Law Professor'sDuty of Public Service
Despite the pervasiveness of the legal profession's stated expectations that
all members of the profession render pro bono public service, assure the
representation of unpopular clients and causes, and assist in law reform and
improving the legal system, some argue that these responsibilities do not
impose any obligation on individual members of the bar or at least do not apply
to members of the bar who earn their living by teaching law. For instance,
Professor Timothy Terrell and James Wildman argue that while lawyers have
a responsibility to see that the bar as an entity assists and enables lawyers
desiring to provide legal services to the needy, "[p]rofessionalism does not
necessarily demand.., that each of us personally pledge to devote time and
effort to legal help for the poor."'8 9 The argument for a collective rather than
personal responsibility for pro bono work, tenuous as it is," 9 has been soundly

184. See, e.g., LEARNING TO SERVE, supra note 147, at 6-7 (defining lawyer profession-

alism and a professional lawyer to include acting "in the spirit of public service" and "dedicated
to justice and the public good").

185. Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, supra note 134, at 1217. The
conference report argued that lawyers have both the special expertise to know when the law is in
need of reform and the special competence to implement the necessary reforms. Id.
186. A Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism,supra note 150; Young Lawyers Division,
Lawyer's Pledge ofProfessionalism,supra note 150.
187. MaeCrate Report, supra note 148, at 213.
188. American Inns of Court, supra note 152.
189. Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism,"41 EMORY
L.J. 403, 430 (1992). Terrell and Wildman's justification for this position includes the argument
that the Bar no longer enjoys a monopoly on legal services. Id. at 421-22.
190. For rebuttals to Terrell and Wildman'sjustifications for contending that lawyers do not
have a personal responsibility to provide pro bono services, see Richard C. Baldwin, "Rethinking
Professionalism"-And Then Living It!, 41 EMORY L.J. 435, 436-47 (1992); Jennifer Gerarda
Brown, Rethinking "The Practiceof Law," 41 EMORY L.J. 451, 454-60 (1992); Steven Lubet,
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rejected as a predominant norm of the legal profession. The Model Code,
Model Rules, and other commanding statements of professional norms stress
that every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or workload, is
expected to donate legal services to the disadvantaged. 9'
Terrell and Wildman complain that requiring pro bono service by some
members of the bar, such as law professors who do not regularly represent
clients, may force those attorneys to undertake matters that are too complicated,

thus compromising competence or requiring the attorney to donate an unfair
portion of her time to the pro bono matter.'9 2 However, the legal service needs
of pro bono clients involve such a wide array of legal tasks, from litigation to
appellate work, legal advice, transactional work, lobbying, and rulemaking, that
any law professor could find some activity that matched her training and
skills.' 93 Law professors also can address competence concerns by assisting
more experienced lawyers who take professional responsibility for the pro bono
case, much as lawyers do injurisdictions where they are not licensed and as law
students do before gaining their licenses to practice law. 94 Further, if law
schools can successfully impose mandatory pro bono requirements on law

ProfessionalismRevisited, 42 EMORY L.J. 197, 199-208 (1993).
191. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 38, at EC 2-25 ("Every lawyer, regardless of
professional prominence or professional workload, should find time to participate in serving the
disadvantaged."); MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 6.1 ("Every lawyer... has a responsibility
to provide legal services to those unable to pay."); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 347 (1981) ("While not providing Disciplinary Rules, the Model Code
leaves no doubt as to the professional responsibility of the individual lawyer... 'The rendition
of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each
lawyer .. ') (quoting MODEL CODE, supra note 38, at EC 2-25); MacCrate Report, supranote
148, at 215 ("This section reaffirms that it is the responsibility of every lawyer to provide pro
bono service."); A Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism,supra note 150 (noting that the legal
profession's goals include "the contribution of uncompensated time and civic influence on behalf
of those persons who cannot afford adequate legal assistance"); American Inns of Court, supra
note 152 ("I will contribute time and resources to ... pro bono work.").
192. Terrell & Wildman, supra note 189, at 430.
193. See, e.g., MODELRULES, supra note 17, at R. 6.1 cmt. 2 (noting that eligible pro bono
legal services consist of a full range of legal activities); Lubet, supranote 190, at 204 (noting that
poor people have the need for, in addition to complex criminal and civil rights representation,
assistance with "will drafting, probate administration, real estate closings, domestic relations
representation, social security appeals, contract negotiation, and all sorts of simple litigation");
see also supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (giving illustrations of the broad array of
legally-related public service that law professors have performed).
194. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at R. 5.5(c)(1) (permitting a lawyer admitted
in another jurisdiction to provide legal services on a temporary basis where associated with a
lawyer admitted to practice in the jurisdiction); id. at R. 5.3 cmt. I (allowing a lawyer to use
nonlawyer assistants provided the lawyer is responsible for their work product); MODEL CODE,
supra note 38, at EC 3-6 (authorizing a lawyer to delegate tasks to a nonlawyer if the lawyer
supervises and maintains responsibility for the delegated work). But cf Rory K. Little, Law
Professorsas Lawyers: Consultants, Of Counsel,and the Ethics ofSelf-Flagellation,42 S. TEx.
L. REv. 345, 346-47 (2001) (questioning whether law professors may need to maintain an
"active" law license even when simply giving advice to current or former students).
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95
students without compromising issues of competence, then law professors
licensed as attorneys ought to be able to engage in similar services without
violating any duties to clients.
Terrell and Wildman also argue that the focus of pro bono service on the
economically disadvantaged imposes a politically-based morality on attorneys
96
who might not share the same goal of assisting the poor. Yet, the scope of
needed pro bono services is so broad that every lawyer can find a client or case
that fits the attorney's moral or political views or find work that does not reflect
any political perspective. Pro bono activities may involve such nonpolitical
work as handling a divorce or drafting a will. Such work can even be done for
97
organizations spanning the political spectrum, rather than for individuals. As
Professor Jennifer Gerarda Brown concluded, "[g]iven the variety of matters
and clients for whom lawyers can work on a pro bono basis, it does not appear
that pro bono service advances any particular political ideology. Altruism is a
moral value, not a political one."' 98
Terrell submits that law professors have an additional argument against a
duty to engage in pro bono work-training law students is a form of public
99
service that meets any pro bono obligation of the legal profession. Under this
view, because there is no personal responsibility of lawyers to engage in pro
bono service, but only a duty owed by the Bar as a whole, law professors meet
their responsibility for adequate distribution of legal services "just by training
their students to take an active and productive role in the legal profession" and

195. See AALS PRO BONO PROJECT, A HANDBOOKON LAW SCHOOLPRO BONO PROGRAMS
9 (2001), available at http://www.aals.org/probono/probono.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2003)
(listing fourteen law schools that require law student pro bono work as a condition of graduation);
LEARNING TO SERVE, supra note 147, at 30-32 (describing three successful mandatory law
student pro bono programs).
196. Terrell & Wildman, supra note 189, at 421, 431.
197. Lubet, supra note 190, at 199-200. Professor Steven Lubet explained:
To be sure, many "poverty lawyers" have their own ideological
agendas, and as laudable as their aims might be, it is not the burden of the
profession to advance them. On the other hand, most of the legal needs of
the poor are decidedly nonpolitical. Not all indigent representation involves
a lawsuit against the welfare bureaucracy or class actions against consumer
finance companies. Helping the poor need not be the equivalent of engaging
in class warfare.
Id. at 200. But see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (noting the involvement of law
professors in pro bono work involving liberal and conservative causes).
198. Brown, supra note 190, at 460; see also Baldwin, supra note 190, at 437-38 ("Our
social commitment to establishing justice and making the machinery of justice available to all
members of society is not a politically biased value; rather, this commitment represents values
fundamental to our system of government.").
199. Timothy P. Terrell, A Tour of the Whine Country: The Challenge of Extending the
Tenets of Lawyer Professionalismto Law Professorsand Law Students, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 1,
25-26 (1994); see also Saundra Torry, On Public Service Issue, ProfessorsUrgedto Teach by
Example, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1991, at F5 (reporting the belief of some law professors that their
teaching is a form of public service).
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by making their students understand the importance of lawyer services. 200
Professor David Luban refutes the suggestion that teaching law is a comparable
substitute for pro bono service by noting that teaching law does nothing to
address the problem that many people and organizations cannot afford legal
services and are therefore denied access to justice. 20 1 Luban further notes that
although law professors make less money than large-firm lawyers of
comparable seniority, the relevant peer group is colleagues in other university
departments, compared with whom law professors are well compensated. 2
Thus, law teaching cannot be considered reduced-cost legal services. Even if
the appropriate comparison group for law professors is practicing lawyers,
practicing lawyers are a group that clearly has pro bono service responsibilities,
thus contradicting the argument that law professors should not fulfill similar
duties.2 °3
A final argument against a duty of law professors to perform pro bono
service and other public service is the claim expressed by some law professors
that "I'm not a lawyer. I'm an academic. ' , 2' The simple response to this
argument is that if the law professor is a member of the Bar, then the professor
is subject to the same rules and duties as any other lawyer. The Model Rules
and Model Code apply to "every lawyer."2 °5 Although some rules apply to a
lawyer only when representing a client or acting as a third-party neutral, the
relevant public service provisions in the Model Rules and Model Code apply
to "a," "all," and "every" lawyer(s) regardless of the lawyer's professional
position.20 6 The AALS stresses that law professors who are lawyers are subject
to, and at a minimum should adhere to, the legal profession ethical rules in
force in the jurisdictions where the professor is admitted.20 7
A member of the bar must comply with certain ethics rules, including the
rules addressing pro bono and public service, even when the lawyer is not

200. Terrell, supranote 199, at 25-26.
201. Luban, supra note 11, at 71.
202. Id. Luban refers to this as the "opportunity-cost argument." Furthermore, law
professors receive countless other nonpecuniary benefits that large firn lawyers do not. Id. at
71-72.
203. Id. Luban also argues that because law teachers reap economic rewards from the legal
profession, they have pro bono responsibilities similar to those of private practitioners. Id. at
67-70.
204. Id. at 66.
205. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at pmbl. 12 ("Every lawyer is responsible for
observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct."); MODEL CODE, supra note 38, at prelim.
statement (explaining that the Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules define the
type of ethical conduct expected of every lawyer).
206. See MODELRULES, supranote 17, at Rs. 1.2(b), 6.1,6.2,6.3,6.4; MODELCODE, supra
note 38, at Canons 2, 8, EC 2-25 to -29, -33, 7-17, 8-1 to -3, -9.
207. AALS, Statement of Good Practicesby Law Professorsin the Discharge of Their
Ethical and Professional Responsibilities (1989) [hereinafter AALS, Statement of Good
Practices],available at http://www.aals.org/ethic.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2003).
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engaged in the practice of law. The ABA's ethics committee explained that "a
lawyer must comply at all times with all applicable disciplinary rules of the
Code of Professional Responsibility whether or not he is acting in his
professional capacity."2 °8 In re Peters illustrates the obligation of a law
professor to comply with the rules of professional conduct, even when acting
solely in a teaching capacity.2" In that case, the dean of a law school was found
to have violated the Model Code by his repeated, unwelcome physical contact
and communication of a sexual nature toward female employees, some of
whom were also students.2 1° The court rejected the contention that a law
professor's ethical obligations and professional responsibilities only apply
of the bar
when representing a clien t '" and disciplined the dean as a member212
rules.
disciplinary
applicable
with
times
all
at
comply
to
for failing
Thus, applicable legal profession norms create unquestionable rights and
duties of a law professor to speak out through pro bono or other volunteer lawrelated public service work.
IV.

LEGAL ACADEMY

NORMS

ON THE RIGHTS AND

DuTIES

TO SPEAK OUT

Although less forceful than the legal profession norms governing attorneys,
legal academy norms also articulate rights and duties oflaw professors to speak
out.
A.

Legal Academy Norms GoverningLaw Student Public Service

Because of its predominant role in preparing students to enter the legal
profession, the legal academy has a significant responsibility to educate law
students about the profession's norms. The ABA's Commission on
Professionalism noted that law schools represent the greatest opportunity to
2
impact professional development and values. " As the first introduction to the
legal profession and its norms, the attention law schools pay to ethics and
professionalism will influence the 35,000 annual law graduates and, hence, the
legal profession, for decades to come. 4 The ABA's MacCrate Report argues

208. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 336 (1974).
209. In re Peters, 428 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1988) (per curiam).
210. Id. at 376. The dean's law school activities were found to demonstrate an indifference
to ethical and legal obligations that reflected adversely on his fitness to practice law and,
therefore, violated Model Code DR 102(A)(6). Id. at 382.
211. Id. at 380.
212. Id. at 382.
213. ABA COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 147, at 16.
214. Id.; TEACHINGANDLEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supranote 146, at 13 (observingthat
the "law school experience has a profound influence on [law students'] professional values and

their understanding of the practice of law and the role of lawyers in our society"). Law schools
are urged not to limit discussion of ethics and professionalism to a single class on professional
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that law schools have a responsibility to stress the fundamental values of the
profession, which include promoting justice, fairness, and morality, and
encompass helping to ensure that assistance is available to those unable to pay
for legal services.2" 5 These values "are at least as important as the substance of
courses or the skills of practice. 21 6 Law schools are enjoined not only to teach
these values, but also to "instill in students the desire to achieve them" later in
practice. 1 7
ABA law school accreditation standards require schools to provide an
educational program that ensures its graduates understand their ethical
responsibilities "for the quality and availability ofjustice" and "for performance
of pro bono legal services."2 8 Thus, the ABA requires that all students in a J.D.
program receive instruction in the values regarded as necessary to participate
effectively and responsibly in the legal profession and in the goals, duties,
values, and responsibilities of the legal profession and its members." 9
Similarly, the AALS requires member schools to implement a J.D. program that
assures its students appreciate the role that the law and lawyers play in
society. 220 One way law schools implement these accreditation and
membership requirements of teaching the values of the legal profession,
including public service, is by instructing students in the Model Rules.
An additional and increasingly common way that law schools convey the
public service values of the profession is through student pro bono programs.
In 1996, the ABA amended its law school accreditation standards to state that,
in addition to curricular instruction in professional values and responsibilities,
a law school should encourage and provide opportunities for student
participation in pro bono activities.22' The AALS's Learning to Serve report,

responsibility and not to limit discussion to the minimum standards required by rules of
professional conduct when issues of values and ethics are raised. ABA COMM'N ON
PROFESSIONALISM, supranote 147, at 17; see also TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM,
supra note 146, at 18-23 (arguing for a more expansive ethics and professionalism curriculum
in law schools).
215. MacCrate Report, supra note 148, at 136, 140-41, 235-36.
216. Id. at 235.
217. Id.
218. ABA Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, Standardsfor the Approval
of Law Schools, pmbl. (2003), availableat http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/preamble.
html (last visited Dec. 19, 2003).
219. Id. at Std. 302(a)(1), 302(b), availableat http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/
chapter3.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2003).
220. AALS, Bylaws of the Association ofAmerican Law Schools, Inc., supra note 63, at
§ 6-3(a); see also id. at § 6-9(b); AALS, Executive Committee Regulations, § 7.3(a) (2003),
available at http://www.aals.org/chapter7.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2003) (requiring member
schools to "provide students with an opportunity.. . to gain an understanding of the lawyer's
professional responsibility").
221. ABA Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, supra note 218, Std. 302(e).
The ABA also encourages students choosing a law school to consider whether a particular school
has the necessary foundation to meet the student's pro bono goals. Standing Committee on Pro
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addressing the role of pro bono and public service in legal education, noted
many objectives of such noncurricular pro bono programs. Pro bono activities
provide positive experiences for students that instill a greater sense of the
importance and benefits of pro bono work and hopefully inspire students
222
toward greater participation in pro bono activities as practicing lawyers. Law
schools and the legal profession hope that this greater interest by students in pro
bono also will help motivate law firms and more experienced lawyers to
perform more pro bono services.223 In addition, pro bono work serves to
educate students about the legal system and its shortcomings and to sensitize
students to the legal needs of the poor and their treatment in the justice
system.224 Student pro bono work helps address the unmet societal need for, and
lawyers' professional responsibility to provide, legal representation for those
who cannot afford an attorney.225 Pro bono work can supply immediate benefits
to students by assisting them to develop lawyering skills, improve their
226
resumes, and make contacts with members of the local bar. Finally, pro bono
programs benefit law schools by improving relationships with the local
community and alumni.227

Bono and Public Service, ABA, Pro Bono Publico - Legal Services, at http://www.abanet.
org/legaled/probono/probono.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2003).
222. LEARNING TO SERVE, supra note 147, at viii, 4; see also Kristin Booth Glen, ProBono
and Public Interest Opportunities in Legal Education, N.Y. ST. B.J., May/June, 1998, at 20,
20-21 (explaining benefits of exposing law students to pro bono opportunities); Deborah L.
Rhode, Culturesof Commitment: ProBonofor Lawyers andLaw Students, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
2415, 2433-35 (1999) (discussing the rationale for law student pro bono programs).
223. This is referred to as the "trickle-up" theory of moral obligation-students who
perform pro bono work as law students will be more inclined to perform pro bono later in their
professional career and these student pro bono experiences will trickle up to others in the legal
profession. Lewis S. Calderon et al., MandatoryProBonoforLawStudents: Another Dimension
in Legal Education, I J.L. & POL'Y 95, 102 (1993); Deborah L. Rhode, The Professional
Responsibilities of Professional Schools, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24, 33 (1999). Students are
encouraged to ask prospective law firms questions about their pro bono program in the hope that
this will motivate firms to do more pro bono work and do it better. See ABA Standing Committee
on Pro Bono and Public Service and the Center for Pro, Bono, The Path to Pro Bono: An
Interviewing Tool for Law Students (2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
downloads/probono/path.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2003).
224. LEARNING TO SERVE, supra note 147, at viii, 4; see also Glen, supra note 222, at 20;
Rhode, supra note 222, at 2435.
225. Glen, supra note 222, at 20. A 1994 ABA report estimated that seventy-one percent
of low-income and sixty-one percent of moderate-income households' legal problems are never
addressed by the civil justice system. ABA CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLC,
LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS 23 (1994).
226. LEARNING TO SERVE, supra note 147, at viii, 5; Rhode, supra note 222, at 2435.
227. LEARNING TO SERVE, supra note 147, at 5-6. In an AALS survey of law school deans,
ninety-one percent believed that the school's public service projects provided valuable good will
in the community; sixty-nine percent believed the projects provided valuable good will among
alumni. Id. at 6.
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The shared belief in the importance of fostering a sense of professional
public service is so pervasive that ninety-five percent of deans in a 1997 AALS
survey agreed that "it is an important goal of law schools to instill in students
a sense of obligation to perform pro bono work during their later careers."22
Thus, the issue is not whether law schools should seek to instill the legal
profession's public service norms, but rather, how this should best be done.
B. Legal Academy Norms Governing Law ProfessorPublic Service
Beyond the norms expressed in curricular and extracurricular programs for
students, law schools express public service norms through their expectations
for members of the academy. The ABA's law school accreditation standards,
in determining the necessary number of full-time faculty, include as a factor the
opportunities for effective participation "in service to the legal profession and
'
the public."229
Law schools are expected to establish policies that address a
full-time faculty member's "[o]bligations to the profession, including working
with the practicing bar and judiciary to improve the profession," and
"[o]bligations to the public, including participation in pro bono activities."23'
Schools also are required to evaluate periodically whether faculty members are
discharging their responsibilities to the profession and the public.'
Although AALS standards address the competence of faculty and the need
for conditions conducive to the effective discharge of their teaching and
scholarly responsibilities, the standards do not address the faculty's public
service obligations or the law school's responsibility to assist faculty in
fulfilling those duties.232 However, the AALS's Statement of Good Practices
by Law Professors in the Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional

228. Id. at 3.
229. ABA Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, supra note 218, at Std. 402
(a)(3).
230. Id. at Std. 404(a)(4)-(5). Outside professional activities must not "unduly interfere
with one's responsibility as a [full-time] faculty member." Id. at Std. 402(c).
231. Id. at Std. 404(b).
232. See AALS, Bylaws of the Association ofAmerican Law Schools, Inc., supra note 63,
§§ 6-5, -8. The AALS bylaws do discuss faculty public service in the section addressing the
amount of professional activities outside of law school that should be allowed. In determining
whether outside activities are properly limited, the AALS notes that it is appropriate to consider
whether the activities are for a public service or private purpose, implying that outside public
service work, although limited, should be given preference over outside private work. See id. at
§ 6-5(f)(iv). The AALS's Executive Committee Regulations embrace teaching law outside the
law school as an appropriate professional activity but make no reference to pro bono or other
forms of law-related public service. AALS, Executive Committee Regulations, supra note 220,
at § 7.8.
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Responsibilities provides guidance.233 Professors are advised that their
responsibilities extend beyond the classroom to include service to others and
2 34
are instructed not to be limited by the pursuit of self interest. In particular,
law professors are reminded that as role models they share the traditional public
2
service and pro bono publico obligations of the bar. " Significantly, in stating
the expectation that law professors engage in public service work, the ABA and
AALS do not distinguish between law professors who possess licenses to
those who do not, although the form of that public service
practice law2 and
36
could differ.
A law professor's right to speak out is advanced by academic freedom
safeguards. The ABA's accreditation standards require law schools to have a
policy on a law professor's academic freedom and reference as an example the

233. AALS, Statement of Good Practices,supra note 207; see also Wilson Ray Huhn, A
Proposed Code of Ethicsfor Law Educators, 6 J.L. & RELIGION 25, 35-36 (1988) (including in
a proposed code of ethics for law educators a requirement that a law professor devote a reasonable
amount of time to pro bono publico work); Robert B. McKay, Ethical Standards for Law
Teachers, 25 ARK. L. REV. 44,46-47 (1971) (including in nine proposed canons of ethics for law
teachers a reminder that, as members of the bar, law professors are bound by the rules of
professional responsibility "to the same extent as any other lawyer" and an expectation that law
teachers "should work for the advancement ofjustice and law reform" and impart to students "an
understanding of, and a belief in, high standards of... ethical responsibility"); Norman Redlich,
Professional Responsibility of Law Teachers, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 623, 628-29 (1980)
(proposing a code ofprofessional responsibility for law teachers that includes an expectation that
law professors devote time for pro bono activities).
234. See AALS, Statement of Good Practices,supra note 207, § V.
235. Id. The statement includes a list of ways that law professors can meet this
responsibility: representing clients through legal aid, public defender, or public interest
organizations; teaching in continuing legal education programs; teaching nonlaw students and
other groups about the legal system; advising government officials on legal issues; assisting in
legislative drafting; or engaging in other law reform activities. Id. But cf. supra note 155 and
accompanying text (noting the expectation of the latest version of the Model Rules that a

substantial portion of a lawyer's pro bono services should be to financially disadvantaged
individuals or to groups that serve persons of limited means). The statement warns professors to

ensure that these activities do not significantly diminish their ability to meet obligations to
students, colleagues, and the law school. AALS, Statement of Good Practices,supra note 207,

§IV.
236. See generally State ex rel Norvell v. Credit Bureau, 514 P.2d 40, 45 (N.M. 1973)

(identifying six indicia of the practice of law for which a law license is needed); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 75, § 4 ("A person not admitted to practice as a lawyer... may not engage in the
unauthorized practice of law, and a lawyer may not assist a person to do so."); LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 73, at 21:8001 (discussing the legal-related activities
that nonlawyers may perform).
The public service duties of law professors at Jesuit law schools, and other religiously
affiliated schools with public service values, are also informed by the institution's justice and
public service missions. See, e.g., Marquette University Law School, JesuitMission at the Law
=
134 (last visited Dec. 21,2003)
School, athttp://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?2130&page)
of Jesuit Colleges and
Association
generally
See
law
school).
the
of
mission
Jesuit
the
(describing
Universities, Our Members, at http://www.ajcunet.edu/areas/ji/members.asp (last visited Dec.
19, 2003) (identifying Jesuit schools).
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AAUP's 1940 Statement ofPrincipleson Academic Freedom and Tenure.237
Likewise, the AALS mandates that law school faculty members shall have the
academic freedom accorded by the principles of the AAUP. 23 8 The AAUP's
academic freedom principles state that when professors speak or write as
citizens they should be free from censorship or discipline.239 However,
professors are warned that "they should at all times be accurate, should exercise
appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should
make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the institution.""
As the AAUP later explained, "the controlling principle is that a faculty
member's expression of opinion as a citizen cannot constitute grounds for
dismissal unless it clearly demonstrates the faculty member's unfitness to serve.
Extramural utterances rarely should bear upon the faculty member's fitness for
'
continuing service."241
The same academic freedom extends to political activity. Like other
citizens, faculty members "should be free to engage in political activities so far
as they are able to do so consistently with their obligations as teachers and
scholars."242
Peter Byrne observes that the academic freedom of a law professor is not
infringed by expecting or even requiring the professor to engage in public
service.243 As members of the legal profession, law professors are already
obligated to engage in public service. 2" More importantly, as Byrne argues,
obliging a law professor to serve does not control the form or ideological nature

237. ABA Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, supra note 218, at Std. 405(b)
& app. I.
238. AALS, Bylaws ofthe Association ofAmerican Law Schools, Inc., supra note 63, § 68(d).
239. AAUP, 1940 Statement ofPrincipleson Academic Freedom and Tenure, supra note
62. The AAUP explains that "the protection of academic freedom and the requirements of
academic responsibility apply not only to the full-time probationary and the tenured teacher, but
also to all others, such as part-time faculty and teaching assistants, who exercise teaching
responsibilities." AAUP, 1970 Interpretative Comments, reprinted in AAUP, POLICY
DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 6.
240. AAUP, 1940 Statement of Principleson Academic Freedom and Tenure, supra note
62; see also AAUP, Statement on ProfessionalEthics (1987), reprinted in AAUP, POLICY
DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 133, 134 (noting that professors, although they have
the rights and obligations of other citizens, "have a particular obligation to promote conditions
of free inquiry and to further public understanding of academic freedom"). The AAUP has
clarified that the obligation to use "appropriate restraint" refers "solely to choice of language and
to other aspects of the manner in which a statement is made. It does not refer to the substance of
a teacher's remarks. It does not refer to the time and place of his utterance." AAUP, Advisory
Letters from the Washington Office, 49 AAUP BuLL. 393 (Winter 1963) (quoted in NEIL W.
HAMILTON, ZEALOTRY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 176 (1995)).
241. AAUP, Statement on ExtramuralUtterances, supra note 35.
242. AAUP, Statement on Professorsand PoliticalActivity (1990), reprintedin AAUP,
POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supranote 62, at 33.
243. Byrne, supra note 65, at 329.
244. Id.
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of that service "any more than a requirement to write dictates the political
tendency of such writing."24 However, there is a risk of outside interference in
the academic freedom of the law school by expecting law professors to do more
than simply teach and write since the school could be attacked for the
controversial pro bono or other public service work of its faculty.2" This is
clearly a risk that law schools must be prepared to bear and defend against.247
By not having the same worries as practicing lawyers about offending
paying clients or taking positions that might be viewed as conflicting with those
of a current client, law professors also enjoy a form of economic freedom.248
Significantly, the AALS takes the position that with enhanced academic and
economic freedoms, law professors assume a greater duty to speak out on
issues of individual and social justice than practicing lawyers:
The fact that a law professor's income does not depend on
serving the interests of private clients permits a law professor
to take positions on issues as to which practicing lawyers may
be more inhibited. With that freedom from economic pressure
goes an enhanced obligation to pursue individual and social
justice.249
In addition to the enhanced right and duty to pursue justice that comes from
having such freedom, a law professor's function as a role model mandates
greater sensitivity to ethical norms and a greater expectation of public service.
The AALS's Statement of Good Practicesnotes the profound influence law
professors can have on student attitudes toward professional responsibility. 5

245. Id. at 330.
246. See Kuehn & Joy, supra note 18, at 1975-89 (including descriptions of politically,

economically, and ideologically-motivated efforts to restrict law school activities because of the
public service actions of law professors).
247. See Byrne, supra note 65, at 330 n.28
Yet, if one subscribes to the view that law professors should speak to the
general public as a service to society, it may make sense that academic
freedom should protect such public utterances. The professor's speech
advances the ethical obligation of the professor and the academic mission
of the professional school.
Luban, supranote 11, at 61 n.5.
248. See Esther F. Lardent, Positional Conflicts in the Pro Bono Context: Ethical
ConsiderationsandMarket Forces,67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2279,2289-90 (1999) (discussing the
overly broad definition of positional conflicts that some law firms employ, in part, because of
their concern over upsetting paying clients); Spaulding,supra note 156, at 1418-20 (reporting that
legal services organizations report that most law firms are careful to avoid certain types of pro
bono work for fear of alienating paying clients). But cf Kuehn & Joy, supranote 18, at 1975-89
(describing instances of outside interference by politicians, alumni, and economic interests in the
case and client selection decisions of law school clinics professors).
249. AALS, Statement of GoodPractices,supra note 207, § V.

250. Id. § I.
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Because they function as role models, professors "should be guided by the most
sensitive ethical and professional standards" and "should assist students to
recognize the responsibility of lawyers to advance individual and social
justice." 25' The ABA's 1986 report on lawyer professionalism likewise argued
that law professors, through their conduct inside and outside the classroom,
serve as important examples for law students of proper professional behavior." 2
If there are not adequate role models in law schools or if those role models lack
a commitment to public service, young lawyers may begin the practice of law
with little appreciation for or commitment to the profession's public service
ideals.2" 3 "Therefore, the highest standards of ethics and professionalism should
be adhered to within law schools. ' '2M
The AALS's Learning to Serve report stresses the importance of law
professors as role models and the need for all law teachers, notjust professional
responsibility teachers, to teach responsibility for public service through their
actions:
The Commission believes that active faculty participation in
pro bono work is highly important for the sake of their
students. Law teachers teach as much about professional
responsibility by what they do as by what they say. If our
conduct and actions are inconsistent with the principles and
rules that we teach, we undermine both our credibility as
teachers and the legitimacy of the ethical principles and rules
themselves. If we appear to be insincere about ourpro bono
responsibilities, we also will encourage law students to be
skeptical, indeed cynical, about the many other 2moral
5
principles that distinguish our profession from a trade.
The ABA's report on teaching and learning professionalism argued that,
"for most [law] students law school professors are their first and most important
role models of lawyers."2 6 Professors' out-of-classroom behavior can enhance

251. Id.

252. ABA COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 147, at 19; see also Baldwin, supra
note 190, at 445 (noting the important role professors play in a student's professional training);
Howard Lesnick, Why Pro Bono in Law Schools, 13 LAW & INEQ. 25, 26 (1994) (observing that
"whether we desire to or not, teachers convey to our students an idea of the meaning of
professional responsibility"). "Law professors can, we believe, positively influence the values and

ethics of students by example and through creative teaching." ABA COMM'N ON
PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 147, at 16.
253. ABA COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 147, at 19.
254. Id.
255. LEARNING TO SERVE, supra note 147, at 17-18.
256. TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 146, at 13.
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or undermine professionalism ideals. 2" Professor Thomas Morgan emphasized
the unassailable importance of modeling a commitment to public service as a
norm of the legal academy: "The sense that professors are uniquely situated to
model a commitment to justice and the public interest-and their moral
obligation to do so-should be largely beyond dispute." 258
Modeling public service may evenbe more important because of the "latent
curriculum" of law schools. Some studies have found that many students who
enter law school highly idealistic and intent on using their legal training to right
perceived injustices leave "jaded or indifferent to the burning issues which
brought them to law school., 25 9 Similarly, students who enter law school with
a public-interest orientation sometimes find themselves diverted away from

257. Id.; see also id. at 17 ("Professors whose consulting or research activities make them
unavailable for ... pro bono service send an unmistakable message to law students about these
professors' and their law school's value system."). The MacCrate Report similarly observed that
"[i]aw school deans, professors, administrators and staff must not only promote these values [of
justice, fairness, and morality] by words, but must so conduct themselves as to convey to students
that these values are essential ingredients of our profession." MacCrate Report, supranote 148,
at 236.
258. Thomas D. Morgan, Law Faculty as Role Models, in SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. &
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONAUSM-SYMPOSIUM
PROCEEDINGS 37,47 (1997).
259. Glen, supra note 222, at 21; see also ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS

36-50, 168-97 (1992) (demonstrating that law students who enter law school for altruistic
reasons experience a disjuncturebetween their personal interests injustice and the ones articulated
in law school and examining whether a public interest law school produces greater numbers of
social activist lawyers); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT 237 (1992) (observing
that law students lose some of their idealism while attending law school); ROBERT V. STOVER,
MAKING IT AND BREAKING IT 12-16 (Howard S. Erlanger ed., 1989) (providing survey results

showing students' declining interest in public interest work over the course of entering and
attending law school); Howard S. Erlanger et al., Law Student Idealism and Job Choice: Some
New Data on an Old Question, 30 LAw & Soc'y REV. 851, 853-55 (1996) (providing survey
information on entering law students' job preferences and the actual jobs subsequently taken by
those students); Howard S. Erlanger & Douglas A. Klegon, SocializationEffects ofProfessional
School: The Law School Experience and Student Orientationsto PublicInterest Concerns, 13
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 27-30 (1978) (providing survey results showing a decrease in law students'
interest in pursuing public interest work entering law school compared to later in law school);
Henry Rose, Law Schools Should Be About Justice Too, 40 CLEV. STATE L. REV. 443, 444-48

(1992) (observing that law students' "altruistic aspirations are often subverted by the process of
legal education" and, hence, students' interest in public interest work declines throughout law
school and also examining the underlying reasons for such a result); Craig Kubey, Three Years
ofAdjustment: Where Your Ideals Go, 6 JuluS DR., Dec. 1976, at 34, 34, 36 (reporting on survey
results that "confirmed the belief that students leave law school less 'idealistic' ... than [when]
they arrive"). But see J. D. Roddy & C. Scott Peters, The Effect of Law School on Political
Attitudes: Some Evidencefrom the Class of 2000, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 33, 34-36, 46 (2003)
(arguing that previous research on the effect of law school on student attitudes is indeterminate
and finding, based on their own research, "no overwhelming support for theories that law school
contributes to major attitudinal changes").
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public interest jobs and into largely corporate careers.26 The possible causes
are many-high tuition and student loans; placement priorities that value
corporate work; and courses that undermine a commitment to social change and
" ' As Dean Kristin Glen argued, exposing students to pro bono and
law reform.26
public interest opportunities reinforces the high ideals of most students and can
serve to counteract unwitting instructional factors that might otherwise
undermine those ideals.2 62 Additionally, emphasizing the importance of pro
bono and other public service work by modeling such activities may help
overcome the perception that many law school professors have a disdain for the
practice of law and, impliedly, for the pro bono and public service
responsibilities of private practitioners.263
Despite the importance of modeling a commitment to public service, the
amount of law faculty public service work is limited. An AALS survey of law
school deans found that about sixty percent were satisfied with the amount of
the faculty's pro bono work, with only half agreeing that many at their schools
"provide good role models to the students by engaging in uncompensated
public service work."2 " The AALS concluded that "the overall state of pro
bono work
currently performed by America's law faculty members is a mixed
5
tale.

26

Perhaps it is not surprising that positive modeling by law professors of
public service work is limited, given the unsupportive messages that law
schools convey about such work. Most law schools do not have faculty policies
that require or encourage faculty members to participate in public service or pro

260. See, e.g., Jill Chaifetz, The Value ofPublicService: A Modelfor Instillinga ProBono
Ethic in Law School, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1699-1702 (1993) (citing numerous articles and
studies on the shift during law school in student interests away from public interest work); Eldred
& Schoenherr, supranote 131, at 401,402 n. 129 (citing studies that the authors describe as not
definitive but generally supportive of the proposition "that the law school experience tends to
diminish law student desire to engage in public service activities and to pursue careers in public
interest law").
261. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 875-76 (3d ed. 2001).
262. Glen, supra note 222, at 21.
263. For a discussion of this disdain, see Harry T. Edwards, The Role of LegalEducation
in Shaping the Profession, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 285, 293 (1988); Luban, supra note 11, at 68;
Carrie Meckel-Meadow, Can a Law TeacherAvoid TeachingLegal Ethics?, 41 J. LEGALEDUC.
3, 7-8 (1991); Terrell, supranote 199, at 5 & n.2.
264. LEARNING TO SERVE, supra note 147, at 17.
265. Id.; see also Torry, supra note 199 (reporting one law professor's estimate that "a
substantial minority" of law professors perform public service). But cf Colbert, supra note 11,
at 550 (reporting that a "high percentage" of clinical law professors indicated they had taken
leadership roles in public service law reform activities). Professor David Luban reports that the
usual reaction when he suggests to law colleagues that they have the same pro bono
responsibilities as other lawyers is that they had never thought about the matter. Luban, supra
note 11, at 70-71. Luban describes this situation as a question of identity as most law professors
consider themselves academics and not also lawyers. Id. at 66-67.
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bono activities, despite the ABA requirement for such policies.266 Service is the
least important of the three criteria for promotion and tenure, far less than
teaching and scholarship.267 Neither the ABA nor the AALS seeks information
on faculty pro bono activities."' Similarly, pro bono activities are not a factor
in the law school rankings by U.S. News & World Report.269 Finally, a good
faculty public service program requires an institutional commitment, yet
because of the factors noted above, such programs find it hard to compete with
other demands on a law school's time and resources.2 7 °

266. LEARNING TO SERVE, supra note 147, at 18; see ABA Section of Legal Educ. and
Admissions to the Bar, supra note 218, at Std. 404(a)(4)-(5). "At most of the schools that did
have policies, the policy simply took the form of a highly general statement that 'service' is
considered along with scholarship and teaching in decisions about promotion or salaries."
LEARNING TO SERVE, supra note 147, at 18; see also AALS PRO BONO PROJECT, supra note 195,
at 31 attachment 18 (containing examples of faculty pro bono policies); ABA STANDING COMM.
ON PRO BONO & PUBLIC SERV., DIRECTORY OF LAW SCHOOL PUBLIC INTEREST AND PRO BONO

PROGRAMS (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/lawschools/
individual schoolslistings.html (last visited Dec. 21,2003) (listing public interest and pro bono
programs at various law schools).
267. See AALS, PURSUING EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 73; AALS, Bylaws of the
Association ofAmerican Law Schools, Inc., supranote 63;supranote 232 and accompanying text
(noting the failure of the AALS standards on law school faculty to address public service
obligations). Professor Henry Gabriel explained the limited significance of public service work
in the tenure process:
The reality of legal academia presents us with two models of professional
survival. The first model is excellence in scholarship and something less
than a disaster in the classroom. The second model is excellence in teaching
and having put something in print. With either paradigm, community
service, whether university and law school committee work, working with
professional organizations, or other activities, such as pro bono
representation of indigents, counts very little.
Henry Gabriel, Juggling Scholarship and Social Commitment: Service to the Community
Through Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 223, 225-26
(1992); see also AALS, PURSUING EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 73 ("[Law professor John
Powell] pointed out that although we require public service of all faculty, faculty are not turned
down for tenure if their service is inadequate."). To help address the disincentives of public
service work, Professor Douglas Colbert proposes that the definition of acceptable scholarship
be broadened to embrace law reform and justice works, such as drafting legislation, developing
fact-finding reports, writing legal briefs, and publishing op-ed articles. Colbert, supra note 11,
at 543-45, 550.
268. Rhode, supra note 222, at 2439. Professor Deborah Rhode argues that "[tlhe absence
of data on nonparticipation makes it easy to draw unduly positive generalizations" about faculty
participation based on a few high-profile faculty pro bono cases. Id.
269. Id. at 2440.
270. Id. at 2439. "The values reflected in the institutional framework of a law school have
an important impact on law students' perception of what is important in the legal system."
TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 146, at 25 (recommending that law

schools develop more co-curricular activities that advance professionalism).
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CONCLUSION

Both the legal profession and the legal academy have clearly established
norms that create rights and duties of law professors to speak out, yet the actual
amount of such public service work by law faculties remains modest. This
failure of law schools and law faculties to "walk the talk" of the importance of
pro bono and other public service activities creates the impression in students
that these norms are largely hollow, hypocritical rhetoric. The academy cannot
expect students to take public service seriously or emulate it later as practicing
attorneys if law faculty do not. Though only speculative, perhaps the failure of
law schools to adopt and seriously follow public service norms for law faculties
is one reason why practicing lawyers, after getting at best indifferent messages

as law students from law faculty, have failed to live up to the legal profession's
public service duties. Law schools, which are accused of doing little to facilitate
and encourage extramural public service activities by law faculties, need to do
more.
There have been many good proposals to enhance faculty public service:
clearer, and perhaps mandatory, faculty policies that include annual public
service expectations and public reporting of that service; ABA and AALS
review of faculty public service performance and development of enforceable
public service expectations; law school supplied research assistance and
administrative support similar to support for scholarship; sabbatical or release
time for such work; increased valuation of public service work in the promotion
and tenure processes; recognizing and rewarding faculty public service work;
including law faculty pro bono work in law school malpractice insurance
policies; and pro bono coordinators for faculty public service work.2"7' Of
course, these actions may not furnish the necessary motivation for faculty
members hostile to the notion that the legal profession and legal academy
should lend their voices and time to issues of public concern. But as pervasive
as public service norms are in the legal profession and academy, it is likely that
law professors share those ideals, and with increased institutional support, more
would be motivated to speak out on public issues.

27 1. See LEARNING TO SERVE, supra note 147, at 18-19 (recommending faculty pro bono
policies with six components: an annual expectation; universality; beyond teaching and
institutional service; institutional support; faculty autonomy; and annual reporting); Luban, supra
note 11, at 74-75; Rhode, supra note 222, at 2444-45; Rhode, supra note 223, at 34-35.
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